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Abstract
To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their prefer-
ences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated
according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings, the voters may often only
provide partial orders. This directly leads to the POSSIBLE WINNER problem that asks,
given a set of partial votes, whether a distinguished candidate can still become a win-
ner. In this work, we consider the computational complexity of POSSIBLE WINNER for
the broad class of voting protocols defined by scoring rules. A scoring rule provides a
score value for every position which a candidate can have in a linear order. Prominent
examples include plurality, k-approval, and Borda. Generalizing previous NP-hardness
results for some special cases, we settle the computational complexity for all but one
scoring rule. More precisely, for an unbounded number of candidates and unweighted
voters, we show that POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-complete for all pure scoring rules ex-
cept plurality, veto, and the scoring rule defined by the scoring vector (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0),
while it is solvable in polynomial time for plurality and veto.
Keywords: Voting systems, NP-hardness, k-approval, partial votes, incomplete
information
1. Introduction
Voting scenarios arise whenever the preferences of different parties (voters) have
to be aggregated to form a joint decision. This is what happens in political elections,
group decisions, web site rankings, or multiagent systems. Often, the voting process is
executed in the following way: each voter provides his preference as a ranking (linear
order) of all the possible alternatives (candidates). Given these rankings as an input,
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a voting rule produces a subset of the candidates (winners) as an output. However,
in realistic settings, the voters may often only provide partial orders (or partial votes)
instead of linear ones: For example, it might be impossible for the voters to provide
a complete preference list because the set of candidates is too large, as it is the case
for web page ranking. In addition, not all voters might have given their preferences
yet during the aggregation process, or new candidates might be introduced after some
voters already have given their rankings. Moreover, one often has to deal with partial
votes due to incomparabilities: for some voters it might not be possible to compare
two candidates or certain groups of candidates, be it because of lack of information
or due to personal reasons. Hence, the study of partial voting profiles is natural and
essential. One question that immediately comes to mind is whether any information on
a possible outcome of the voting process can be given in the case of incomplete votes.
More specifically, in this paper, we study the POSSIBLE WINNER problem: Given a
partial order for each of the voters, can a distinguished candidate c win for at least one
extension of the partial orders into linear ones?
Of course, the answer to this question depends on the voting rule that is used. In
this work, we will stick to the broad class of scoring rules. A scoring rule provides
a score value for every position that a candidate can take within a linear order, given
as a scoring vector of length m in the case of m candidates. The scores of the can-
didates are then added over all votes and the candidates with the highest score win.
Famous examples are Borda, defined by the scoring vectors (m − 1,m − 2, . . . , 0)
and k-approval, defined by (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) starting with k ones. Two relevant
special cases of k-approval are plurality, defined by (1, 0, . . . , 0), and veto, defined
by (1, . . . , 1, 0). Typically, k-approval can be used in political elections whenever
the voters can express their preference for k candidates within the set of all candi-
dates. Another example is the Formula 1 scoring, which until the year 2009 used
the scoring rule defined by the vector (10, 8, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, . . . , 0) and since 2010
uses (25, 18, 15, 12, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2, 1, 0, . . . , 0).
The study of the computational complexity of voting problems is an active area of
research (see the surveys [9, 19]). The POSSIBLE WINNER problem was introduced by
Konczak and Lang [26] and has been further investigated since then for many types of
voting systems [7, 27, 31, 33, 34]. Note that the related NECESSARY WINNER problem
(Given a set of partial orders, does a distinguished candidate c win for every extension
of the partial orders into linear ones?) can be solved in polynomial time for all scoring
rules [34].
A prominent special case of POSSIBLE WINNER is MANIPULATION (see e.g. [8,
13, 25, 36, 37]). Here, the given set of partial orders consists of two subsets; one
subset contains linearly ordered votes and the other one completely unordered votes.
Clearly, all NP-hardness results would carry over from MANIPULATION to POSSIBLE
WINNER. However, whereas the case of weighted voters is settled by a full dichotomy
for MANIPULATION for scoring rules [25], so far, for unweighted voters we are only
aware of one NP-hardness result for a specially constructed scoring rule [35]. Indeed,
the NP-hardness of MANIPULATION for Borda is a prominent open question [35, 36].
There are NP-hardness results for MANIPULATION in the unweighted voter case for
several common voting rules which are not scoring rules [20, 21, 36]. Another closely
related problem is PREFERENCE ELICITATION (see e.g. [11, 12]). Here, the idea is to
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avoid that each voter has to report his whole preference list, but to ask only for some
part of the information that suffices to determine a winner.
Now, let us briefly summarize the known results for POSSIBLE WINNER for scoring
rules. Correcting Konczak and Lang [26] who claimed polynomial-time solvability for
all scoring rules, Xia and Conitzer [34] provided NP-completeness results for a class of
scoring rules, more specifically, for all scoring rules that have four “equally decreasing
score values” followed by another “strictly decreasing score value”; we will provide
a more detailed discussion later. Betzler et al. [7] studied the multivariate complexity
of POSSIBLE WINNER for scoring rules and other types of voting systems, providing
an NP-hardness proof for k-approval in case of only two partial votes. However, this
NP-hardness result holds only if k is part of the input and does not carry over for fixed
values of k. Furthermore, whereas the corresponding many-one reduction relies on two
partial votes, the construction used in this work makes use of an unbounded number of
partial votes and thus is completely different.
Until now, the computational complexity of POSSIBLE WINNER was still open for
a large number of naturally appearing scoring rules. One such open case has been k-
approval for small values of k which is motivated as follows. A common way of voting
for a board consisting of a small number, for example, of five members, is that every
voter awards one point each to five of the candidates (5-approval). A second example
is given by voting systems in which each voter is allowed to specify a (small) group of
favorites and a (small) group of most disliked candidates. As final example, we mention
scoring rules that have decreasing differences between successive score values as, for
example, the scoring vector (2m, 2m−1, . . . , 0).
This work aims at a computational complexity dichotomy for pure scoring rules.
The class of pure scoring rules covers all of the common scoring rules. It only consti-
tutes some restrictions in the sense that for different numbers of candidates the corre-
sponding scoring vectors cannot be chosen completely independently (see Section 2).
Our results can also be extended to broad classes of “non-pure” scoring rules, see Sec-
tion 7. Altogether, we settle the computational complexity of POSSIBLE WINNER for
all pure scoring rules except the scoring rule defined by (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0). For plural-
ity and veto, we provide polynomial-time algorithms whereas for the remaining cases
we show NP-completeness. Surprisingly, this includes the NP-hardness of POSSIBLE
WINNER even for 2-approval. Our NP-hardness result for 2-approval has also been
used to settle the complexity of the SWAP BRIBERY problem [16].
2. Preliminaries
Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} be the set of candidates. A vote is a linear order (i.e., a
transitive, antisymmetric, and total relation) on C. An n-voter profile P on C con-
sists of n votes (v1, . . . , vn) on C. A voting rule r is a function from the set of all
profiles on C to the power set of C, that is r(P ) denotes the set of winners. (Posi-
tional) scoring rules are a special kind of voting rules. They are defined by scoring
vectors −→α = (α1, α2, . . . , αm) with integers α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm, the score values.
More specifically, we define that a scoring rule r consists of a sequence of scoring vec-
tors s1, s2, . . . such that for any i ∈ N>0 there is a scoring vector si for i candidates
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which can be computed in time polynomial in i.2 Here, we focus our attention on pure
scoring rules, that is for every i ≥ 2, the scoring vector for i candidates can be obtained
from the scoring vector for i − 1 candidates by inserting an additional score value at
an arbitrary position (respecting the described monotonicity). This definition includes
all of the common protocols like Borda or k-approval. We further assume that αm = 0
and that there is no integer greater than one that divides all score values. This does not
constitute a restriction since for every other voting system there must be an equivalent
one that fulfills these constraints [25, Observation 2.2]. Moreover, we only consider
non-trivial scoring rules, that is, scoring rules with α1 6= 0 for scoring vectors of every
size.
For a vote v ∈ P and a candidate c ∈ C, let the score s(v, c) be defined by s(v, c) :=
αj where j is the position of c in v. For any profile P = {v1, . . . , vn}, let s(P, c) :=∑n
i=1 s(vi, c). Whenever it is clear from the context which P we refer to, we will just
write s(c). A scoring rule selects all candidates c as winners with maximum s(P, c)
over all candidates.
A partial vote on C is a transitive and antisymmetric relation on C. We use >
to denote the relation given between candidates in a linear order and ≻ to denote the
relation given between candidates in a partial vote. Sometimes, we specify a whole
subset of candidates in a partial vote, e.g., e ≻ D for a candidate e ∈ C and a subset
of candidates D ⊆ C. Unless stated otherwise, this notation means that e ≻ d for
all d ∈ D and there is no specified order among the candidates in D. In contrast,
writing e > D in a linear order means that e > d1 > · · · > dl for an arbitrary but fixed
order of D = {d1, . . . , dl}. A linear order v′ extends a partial vote v if v ⊆ v′, that
is, for any i, j ≤ m, from ci ≻ cj in v it follows that ci > cj in v′. Given a profile of
partial votes P = (v1, . . . , vn) on C, a candidate c ∈ C is a possible winner if there
exists an extension P ′ = (v′1, . . . , v′n) such that each v′i extends vi and c ∈ r(P ′). The
corresponding decision problem is defined as follows.
POSSIBLE WINNER
Given: A set of candidates C, a profile of partial votes P = (v1, . . . , vn)
on C, and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C.
Question: Is there an extension profileP ′ = (v′1, . . . , v′n) such that each v′i
extends vi and c ∈ r(P ′) ?
This definition allows that multiple candidates obtain the maximal score and we end
up with a whole set of winners. If the possible winner c has to be unique, one speaks
of a possible unique winner, and the corresponding decision problem is defined analo-
gously. All our results hold for both cases.
Several of our NP-hardness proofs rely on reductions from the NP-complete EX-
ACT COVER BY 3-SETS (X3C) problem [24] defined as follows. Given a set of el-
ements E = {e1, . . . , eq}, a family of subsets S = {S1, . . . , St} with |Si| = 3 and
Si ⊆ E for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, it asks whether there is a subset S ′ ⊆ S such that for every ele-
ment ej ∈ E there is exactly one Si ∈ S ′ with ej ∈ Si. In our NP-hardness proofs we
2For scoring rules that are defined for a constant number of candidates, the POSSIBLE WINNER problem
can be decided in polynomial time, see [13, 33].
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Scoring rule Result
Plurality and Veto in P Proposition 1, Section 4
different-type NP-c (X3C) Theorem 1, Section 5
equal-type NP-c (MC/X3C) Theorem 2, Lemmata 3 – 6, Section 6.1
α1 > α2 = αm−1 > 0 NP-c (X3C) Theorem 4, Section 6.2
and α1 6= 2 · α2
(2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) ?
Table 1: Overview of results and outline of the work. Basically, we partition the scoring rules into five
different types according to the types of algorithms or many-one reductions that are used to achieve the
results. By “different-type” we denote all scoring vectors with an unbounded number of different score
values. By “equal-type” we denote all scoring vectors with an unbounded number of equal score values if not
listed explicitly in another type. Reductions are from EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS (X3C) or MULTICOLORED
CLIQUE (MC).
need to describe the consequence of extending partial votes for specific candidates. To
this end, we say that a candidate ci is shifted to the left (right) by another candidate cj
when adding the constraint ci ≻ cj (cj ≻ ci) to a partial vote.
In some of our theorems, we will need functions that map each instance of a certain
problem P to some natural number and in some sense behave like a polynomial. For
this sake, we call
f : {I | I is an instance of P} → N
a poly-type function for P if the function value f(I) is bounded by a polynomial in |I|
for every input instance I of P .
3. General strategy
This work aims at providing a dichotomy for POSSIBLE WINNER for practically
relevant scoring rules. To this end, we will show the following.
Theorem. POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-complete for all non-trivial pure scoring rules
except plurality, veto, and scoring rules for which there is a constant z such that
the produced scoring vector is (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) for every number of candidates greater
than z. For plurality and veto, POSSIBLE WINNER is solvable in polynomial time.
The proof consists of several parts, see Table 1 for an overview. The polynomial
time results for plurality and veto are based on flow computations. Regarding the
NP-hardness results, we give many-one reductions that work for scoring rules that
produce specific “types of scoring vectors” for an appropriate number of candidates.
We combine the single results to obtain the main result in Section 7. To this end, we
have to take into account that, in general, a scoring rule might produce different types
of scoring vectors for different numbers of candidates.
The basic observation to classify the scoring vectors is that a scoring vector of
unbounded size must have an unbounded number of different score values or an un-
bounded number of equal score values. This leads to the following strategy. First,
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we show NP-hardness for all scoring vectors having an unbounded number of differ-
ent score values. To this end, we generalize a many-one reduction due to Xia and
Conitzer [34]. Second, we deal with scoring vectors having an unbounded number
of equal score values. Here, we consider two subcases, i.e., scoring vectors of type
α1 > α2 = αm−1 > 0 but α1 6= 2 · α2, and all remaining scoring vectors with an
unbounded number of equal score values.
Before stating the specific results, we give a construction scheme that is used in all
many-one reductions in this work.
3.1. A General Scheme to Construct Linear Votes
In all many-one reductions presented in this work, one constructs a partial profile P
consisting of a set of linear orders V l and a set of partial votes V p. The position
of the distinguished candidate c is already determined in every vote from V p, that
is, s(P ′, c) is the same in every extension P ′ and thus is fixed. The “interesting” part
of the reductions is given by the partial votes of V p in combination with upper bounds
for the scores which the non-distinguished candidates can make in V p. For every
candidate c′ ∈ C\{c}, the maximum partial score smaxp (c′) is the maximum number
of points c′ may make in V p without beating c in P . More precisely, for the unique
winner case, smaxp (c′) = s(P ′, c)− s(V l, c′)− 1 and, for the winner case, smaxp (c′) =
s(P ′, c) − s(V l, c′) for any extension P ′ of P . Since the maximum partial scores can
be adjusted to the unique and to the winner case, all results hold for both cases.
In the following, we show that for all our reductions, there is an easy way to cast
the linear votes such that the maximum partial scores that are required in the reductions
are realized. For every many-one reduction of this work, it will be easy to verify that
the underlying partial profile fulfills the following two properties.3
Property 1 There is a “dummy” candidate d which cannot beat the distin-
guished candidate in any extension, that is, smaxp (d) ≥ α1 ·|V p|.
Property 2 For every c′ ∈ C\{c}, the maximum partial score smaxp (c′)
can be written as a sum of at most |V p| integers from {α1, . . . , αm}. For-
mally, the definition of smaxp (c′)will be of the form smaxp (c′) =
∑m
j=1 nj αj
where nj ∈ N0 denotes how often the score value αj is added. We will
always have that
∑m
j=1 nj ≤ |V
p|, that is, the total number of summands
is at most the number of partial votes.
The sets of linear votes which are necessary for the reductions given in this paper
can be obtained according to the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given a scoring rule r, a set of candidates C with distinguished candi-
date c ∈ C, a set of partial votes V p in which c is fixed, and smaxp (c′) for all c′ ∈
C\{c}, a set of linear votes that realizes the maximum partial scores for all candidates
can be constructed in time polynomial in |V p| and m if Properties 1 and 2 hold.
3The only exception appears in the proof of Theorem 4 and will be discussed there.
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v1 : c1 > c2 > . . . > cm−1 > cm
v2 : c2 > c3 > . . . > cm > c1
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.
.
.
vm−1 : cm−1 > cm > . . . > cm−3 > cm−2
vm : cm > c1 > . . . > cm−2 > cm−1
Figure 1: Circular block for c1, c2 . . . , cm
PROOF. We are interested in “setting” relative score difference between the distin-
guished candidate c and every other candidate. By inserting one linear order we change
the relative score difference between c and all other candidates. To be able to change
the relative score difference only for c and one specific candidate while keeping the rel-
ative score difference of c and all other candidates, we will build V l by sets of circular
shifts instead of single votes. More precisely, for a set of candidates {c1, c2, . . . , cm} ,
a circular block consists of m linear orders as given in Figure 1. Clearly, all candidates
have the same score within a circular block.
We start with the construction for the winner case and then explain how to adapt
it for the unique winner case. For the winner case (smaxp (c′) = s(P ′, c) − s(V l, c′)
for any extension P ′), for each candidate c′ ∈ C\{c, d} where d denotes a dummy as
specified in Property 1, add the following votes to the set of linear votes V l. For each
nj 6= 0 as specified in Property 2, construct nj circular blocks over C such that in
one of the linear orders of every block, c′ sits on position j and d sits on position m.
Exchange the places of c′ and d in this linear order and add the modified circular
block to V l. Then, for one block, c′ has lost αj points and gained αm = 0 points
relative to c. Thus, in total, one has the situation that c and c′ have exactly the same
score if c′ makes smaxp (c′) points in V p. This settles the winner case. For the unique-
winner case, we additionally decrease the score of c′ by the minimum of {αi−αj |
αi > αj and i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}}. This can be achieved by adding a circular block
such that in one of the linear orders of the block, c′ sits on position αi and d sits on
position αj , and by exchanging the places of c′ and d in this linear order. Then, c
beats c′ if c′ makes at most smaxp (c′) points in V p and c′ beats c, otherwise.
Altogether, due to Property 2, we add at most |V p| summands for each candidate.
Hence, so far, the number of linear votes is bounded by m2 · (|V p| + 1) and can be
constructed in polynomial time. It remains to adjust the maximum partial score of d.
Until now, we added at most m · (|V p|+ 1) circular blocks. Thus, d can make at most
α1 ·m · |V p| points more than c. By adding m(|V p|+1)+ |V p| further circular blocks
for candidates from C\{d} that are inserted in the first m− 1 positions, while d is put
on the last position in these votes, smaxp (d) can be realized in polynomial time. ✷
4. Plurality and Veto
Employing network flows turned out to be useful to design algorithms for several
voting problems (see e.g. [17, 18]). Here, by using some flow computations very simi-
lar to [7, Theorem 6], we show the following.
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v4
v1 a
b
d
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
s(c)− 11
1s t
v5
s(c)− 1
s(c)− 1v1 : a ≻ c ≻ d, b ≻ c
v2 : c ≻ a ≻ b ⇒ c > a > b > d
v3 : a ≻ d ≻ b ⇒ c > a > d > b
v4 : a ≻ b ≻ c
v5 : a ≻ c, b ≻ d
Figure 2: POSSIBLE WINNER for plurality: The left-hand side shows an example for an election and the
right-hand side the corresponding flow network. The votes v2 and v3 can be extended such that c takes the
first position. The position of the remaining candidates in v2 and v3 is not relevant; one possibility how to
extend these votes is shown in the picture.
Proposition 1. POSSIBLE WINNER can be solved in polynomial time for plurality and
veto.
PROOF. First, we give an algorithm for plurality. Let P on C denote a POSSIBLE
WINNER-instance with distinguished candidate c. Clearly, it is safe to set c to the
first position in all votes in which this is possible. Then the score of c is fixed at the
maximum possible value. We denote the partial votes of P in which the first position is
not taken by c as P1. Now, we can model the problem as network flow as follows (see
Figure 2): The flow network consists of a source node s, a target node t, one node for
every vote of P1, and one node for every candidate from C\{c}. There are three layers
of arcs:
1. an arc from s to every node corresponding to a vote in P1 with capacity one,
2. an arc from a node corresponding to vj ∈ P1 to a node corresponding to a
candidate c′ ∈ C\{c}with capacity one if and only if c′ can take the first position
in an extension of vj , and
3. an arc from every node corresponding to c′ ∈ C\{c} to target t with capac-
ity s(c)− 1.
Now, c is a possible winner if and only if there is a flow of size |P1|: The first layer
simulates that the first position of every partial vote from P1 has to be taken, the second
layer that it can only be taken by appropriate candidates, and the last one that the score
of every candidate will be lower than the score of c. Clearly, the flow network can be
constructed in time polynomial in |P1| and an integral flow computation can be done
in polynomial time [14].
For veto, we first fix c at the best (leftmost) possible position in every vote. This
fixes the maximum score of c. Then for every candidate c′ ∈ C \ {c}, let z(c′) denote
the minimum number of last positions that c′ must take such that it does not beat c.
Let P1 denote the set of partial votes in which c does not take the last position. Again,
we model the problem by a flow network with source node s, target node t, one node
for every candidate from C\{c}, and one node for every vote of P1. The arcs are as
follows:
1. an arc from s to every node corresponding to c′ ∈ C\{c} with capacity z(c′),
2. an arc from a node corresponding to c′ ∈ C\{c} to a node corresponding to vj ∈
P1 with capacity one if and only if c′ can take the last position in an extension
of vj , and
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3. an arc from every node corresponding to vj ∈ P1 to target t with capacity 1.
By similar arguments as for plurality, it follows that c is a possible winner if and only
if there is a flow of size
∑
c′∈C\{c} z(c
′). ✷
5. An unbounded number of positions with different score values
Xia and Conitzer [34] developed a many-one reduction from EXACT COVER BY
3-SETS showing that POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-complete for any scoring rule with
scoring vectors which contain four consecutive, “equally decreasing” score values, fol-
lowed by another strictly decreasing score value. Using some additional gadgetry, we
extend their proof to work for scoring vectors with an unbounded number of different,
not necessarily equally decreasing score values.
We start by describing the basic idea employed in [34] (using a slightly modified
construction). Given an X3C-instance (E,S), construct a partial profile P := V l ∪V p
on a set of candidates C where V l denotes a set of linear orders and V p a set of partial
votes. To describe the basic idea, assume that there is a scoring vector with α1 > α2
and and the differences between the four following score values are equally decreasing,
that is, α2−α3 = α3−α4 = α4−α5. Then, C := {c, x, w} ∪ E where E is the
universe from the X3C-instance. The distinguished candidate is c. The candidates
whose element counterparts belong to the set Si are denoted by ei1, ei2, ei3. The partial
votes V p consist of one partial vote vpi for every Si ∈ S which is given by
x ≻ ei1 ≻ ei2 ≻ ei3 ≻ C
′
, w ≻ C′
with C′ := C\{x, ei1, ei2, ei3, w}. Note that in vpi , the positions of all candidates
except w, x, ei1, ei2, ei3 are fixed. More precisely, w has to be inserted between posi-
tions 1 and 5 maintaining the partial order x ≻ ei1 ≻ ei2 ≻ ei3. By setting the linear
votes, the maximum partial scores are realized such that the following three conditions
hold.
• For every element candidate e ∈ E one has the following. Inserting w behind e
in two partial votes has the effect that e would beat c, whereas whenw is inserted
behind e in at most one partial vote, c still beats e (Condition 1). Note that e may
occur in several votes at different positions, e.g. e might be identical with ei1
and ej3 for i 6= j. However, due to the condition of “equally decreasing” scores,
“shifting” e increases its score by the same value in all of the votes.
• The maximum partial score of x is set such that if takes more than |V p| − |E|/3
times the first position, then it would beat c. That is, w must be inserted before x
at least |V p| − |E|/3 times (Condition 2).
• We set smaxp (w) = (|V p| − |E|/3) · α1+|E|/3 · α5. This implies that if w
is inserted before x in |V p| − |E|/3 votes, then it must be inserted at the last
possible position, that is, position 5, in all remaining votes (Condition 3).
Having an exact 3-cover for (E,S), extend the partial votes as follows.
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vpi : x > ei1 > ei2 > ei3 > w > . . . if Si is in the exact 3-cover
vpi : w > x > ei1 > ei2 > ei3 > . . . if Si is not in the exact 3-cover.
Then, every element candidate e is shifted exactly once (in vpi for e ∈ Si, if Si is in
the exact 3-cover) and thus is beaten by c. It is easy to verify that c beats w and x as
well. In a yes-instance for (C,P, c), it follows directly from Condition 2 and 3 that w
must have the position 5 in exactly |E|/3 votes and the first position in all remaining
partial votes. Since there are |E|/3 partial votes such that three element candidates are
shifted in each of them, due to Condition 1, every element candidate must appear in
exactly one of these votes. Hence, c is a possible winner in P if and only if there exists
an exact 3-cover of E.
By inserting further candidates, one can pad the construction such that is also works
if the equally decreasing score differences appear at other positions [34]. Now, we
consider the situation in which no such equally decreasing score differences appear
at all. More precisely, we show how to extend the reduction to scoring vectors with
strictly, but not equally decreasing scoring values. The problem we encounter is the
following: By sending candidate w to the last possible position in the partial vote vpi ,
each of the candidates ei1, ei2, ei3 improves by one position and therefore improves
its score by the difference given between the corresponding positions. In [34], these
differences all had the same value, but now we have to deal with varying differences.
Since the same candidate e ∈ E may appear in several votes at different positions,
e.g. e might be identical with ei1 and ej3 for i 6= j, it is not clear how to set the
maximum partial score of e. Basically, to cope with this situation, we construct three
partial votes v1i , v2i , and v3i for every set Si ∈ S and permute the positions of the
candidates ei1, ei2, ei3 such that each of them takes a different position in v1i , v2i , v3i .
For example:
v1i : · · · ≻ x ≻ ei1 ≻ ei2 ≻ ei3 ≻ . . .
v2i : · · · ≻ x ≻ ei2 ≻ ei3 ≻ ei1 ≻ . . .
v3i : · · · ≻ x ≻ ei3 ≻ ei1 ≻ ei2 ≻ . . . .
In this way, if the candidate w is sent to the last possible position in all three partial
votes of a set Si, each of the candidates ei1, ei2, ei3 improves its score by the same
value. We only have to guarantee that whenever w is sent back in the partial vote v1i ,
then it has to be sent back v2i and v3i as well. This is realized by a gadget construction,
which is the main technical contribution of the following theorem.
Theorem 1. An X3C-instance I can be reduced to a POSSIBLE WINNER-instance for
a scoring rule which produces a scoring vector having f(I) positions with different
score values. A suitable poly-type function f can be computed in polynomial time.
PROOF. Given an X3C-instance (E,S) with S = {S1, . . . , St} and Si = {ei1, ei2, ei3}
for i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, construct a partial profile P on C as follows. The set of candidates
is defined as C := {x,w, c} ⊎ E ⊎ D12 ⊎ D13 ⊎ L (where ⊎ denotes the disjoint
union), where E is the set of candidates that represent the elements of the universe of
the X3C-instance, D12 := {d1, . . . , dt, h1, . . . , ht}, D13 := {d′1, . . . , d′t, h′1, . . . , h′t},
and L := {l1, . . . , lt}. We define f ((E,S)) := |C|. To ease the presentation,
we first assume that we have a strictly decreasing scoring vector of size f ((E,S))
and describe how to generalize this at the end of the proof. The partial profile con-
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smaxp (w) = (3t− q) · α1+q · α5+2t
smaxp (x) = q · α1+(3t− q) · α2
∀e ∈ E smaxp (e) = (α2+α3+α4) + (ne − 1) · (α3+α4+α5) + fixed(e)
∀di smaxp (di) = q/3 · α4+i+(t− q/3) · α5+i +fixed(di)
∀hi smaxp (hi) = q/3 · α4+i+(t− q/3) · α5+i +fixed(hi)
∀d′i s
max
p (d
′
i) = q/3 · α4+i+t+(t− q/3) · α5+i+t +fixed(d
′
i)
∀h′i s
max
p (h
′
i) = q/3 · α4+i+t+(t− q/3) · α5+i+t +fixed(h
′
i)
∀li s
max
p (li) = 2t · α1+fixed(li)
Table 2: Maximum partial scores. Recall that t = |S|, q = |E|, and ne = |{Si ∈ S | e ∈ Si}|.
sists of a set of partial votes V p and a set of linear votes V l. The partial votes are
V p := {v1i , v
2
i , v
3
i | 1 ≤ i ≤ t} with,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ t− 1,
v1i : x ei1 ei2 ei3 d1 . . . di hi+1 . . . ht d
′
1 . . . d
′
i h
′
i+1 . . . h
′
t ≻ C
1
i , w ≻ C
1
i
v2i : x ei2 ei3 ei1 h1 . . . hi di+1 . . . dt l1 . . . . . . . . . lt ≻ C
2
i , w ≻ C
2
i
v3i : x ei3 ei1 ei2 l1 . . . . . . . . . lt h
′
1 . . . h
′
i d
′
i+1 . . . d
′
t ≻ C
3
i , w ≻ C
3
i
and
v1t : x et1 et2 et3 d1 . . . dt d
′
1 . . . d
′
t ≻ C
1
t , w ≻ C
1
t
v2t : x et2 et3 et1 h1 . . . ht l1 . . . lt ≻ C
2
t , w ≻ C
2
t
v3t : x et3 et1 et2 l1 . . . lt h
′
1 . . . h
′
t ≻ C
3
t , w ≻ C
3
t
where “≻” signs are partially omitted and C1i , C2i , and C3i denote the remaining can-
didates that are fixed in an arbitrary order, respectively. Now, we give some notation
needed to define the maximum partial scores. For c′ ∈ C\{c}, let fixed(c′) denote
the number of points which c′ makes in the partial votes in which the position of c′ is
already fixed. Let ne denote the number of subsets with e ∈ Si and q = |E|. Due to
Lemma 1, one can set the maximum partial scores as given in Table 2. The particular
partial scores will be explained within the proof of the following claim.
Claim: Candidate c is a possible winner of P if and only if there is an exact 3-cover
for (E,S).
“⇐”: Given an exact 3-cover S ′ ⊆ S, complete the votes in V p in the following
way: For each Si ∈ S ′, place w in the last possible position (i.e., position 5 + 2t)
in the partial votes v1i , v2i , and v3i , and on the first position in the remaining partial
votes. Since |S ′| = q/3, in the extension of the votes from V p ones has s(w) =
(3t − q) · α1+q · α5+2t = smaxp (w) and s(x) = q · α1+(3t − q) · α2 = smaxp (x).
Furthermore, it is easy to see that s(li) < smaxp (li) for every i. Every element candi-
date e is shifted to the left in exactly three partial votes. More precisely, in the three
votes that correspond to Si ∈ S ′ with e ∈ Si, it makes α2+α3+α4 points and
(ne − 1) · (α3+α4+α5) + fixed(e) points in the remaining votes and thus does not
beat c. Every candidate from D12 is not “fixed” in exactly one vote of every triple
corresponding to an Si. More precisely, it can be shifted either in v1i or in v2i and never
in v3i . Due to the insertion of w, it is shifted to position 4 + i in q/3 of the votes and
takes position 5 + i in the remaining t− q/3 non-fixed votes. Thus, it does not beat c.
Analogously, every candidate from D13 makes α4+i+t points in q/3 of the non-fixed
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votes andα5+i+t in the remaining t−q/3 votes and hence does not beat c. Altogether, c
beats every other candidate and wins.
“⇒”: Consider an extension of P in which c wins. Due to its maximum partial score,
candidate x can take the first position only q times. Thus, it must be shifted 3t − q
times to position 2. Clearly, this is only possible if w is placed on the first position
in 3t − q votes. Then due to its maximum partial score, w can only be set to posi-
tion 5 + 2t in the remaining q votes. In the following, we will show that for every i, w
takes position 5 + 2t in v1i if and only if it takes position 5 + 2t in v2i if and only if it
takes position 5+ 2t in v3i (Observation I). Then it follows that in the votes in which w
takes position 5 + 2t, the corresponding element candidates are shifted to the left and
obtain α2+α3 +α4 points each, whereas they obtain α3+α4+α5 points in the re-
maining corresponding vote triples. Since each element candidate ej can only obtain
α2+α3+α4 points exactly once (and the scoring values are strictly decreasing), the
set S ′ := {Si | w is placed on position 5 + 2t in v1i } must be an exact 3-cover of E.
It remains to settle Observation I, which says that w behaves equally in the votes
corresponding to one subset. First, we argue that w must be inserted at position 5 + 2t
in exactly q/3 votes of V p1 := {v1i | 1 ≤ i ≤ t}, V
p
2 := {v
2
i | 1 ≤ i ≤ t}, and
V p3 := {v
3
i | 1 ≤ i ≤ t}, respectively. Assume that w is inserted at position 5 + 2t in
more than q/3 votes of V p1 . Then, d1, which is not fixed in every vote of V
p
1 , would
beat c. Analogously, if w was inserted at position 5 + 2t in more than q/3 votes of V p2
or V p3 , then c would be beaten by h1 or h′1, respectively. Now, we have that w must
take position 5+ 2t in q votes and can take this position in at most q/3 votes from V pi ,
for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and thus must take this position in exactly q/3 votes of V p1 , V
p
2 ,
and V p3 .
Second, we show that the candidates from D12 ensure that w takes position 5 + 2t
in v1i if and only if w takes position 5+2t in v2i . The proof is by contradiction. Assume
that there is an extension in which w takes position 5 + 2t in v1i and another position
in v2i for any i. Since di and hi+1 have been shifted to the left in v1i , each of them can
only be shifted to the left in at most q/3 − 1 further votes. By construction, v2i is the
only vote of V p1 ∪ V
p
2 in which neither di nor hi+1 is shifted to the left by setting w
to position 5 + 2t. However, since w can either take the first or position 2t + 5 in an
extension (as argued above), it must take the first position in v2i . Now, w has to take
the position 5 + 2t in 2q/3− 1 further votes from V p1 ∪ V
p
2 and thus in each of these
votes w will either shift di or hi+1. Hence, either di or hi+1 must be shifted to the left
in more than q/3 − 1 further votes and will beat c, a contradiction. The other case (w
takes position 5 + 2t in v2i and another position in v1i ) follows in complete analogy by
considering hi and di+1. One can show analogously that the candidates of D13 ensure
that w takes position 5 + 2t in v1i if and only if it takes the same position in v3i . Thus,
Observation I follows.
Now, one has that POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-hard for all scoring rules with a scor-
ing vector of size f((E,S)) with strictly decreasing score values. By using some sim-
ple padding, we extend the result for the remaining cases, that is for scoring vectors of
size m′ > f((E,S)) andf((E,S)) different score values. To this end, we introduce a
set of m′−f((E,S)) new dummy candidates and cast the linear votes such they cannot
beat the distinguished candidate in any extension. The original candidates from C are
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placed on positions endued with strictly decreasing points, whereas the new candidates
are placed on the remaining positions. Then, if the positions of candidates get shifted
(when w is inserted), the “old” candidates are affected in the same manner as in the
above construction and the theorem follows. ✷
6. An unbounded number of positions with equal score values
In the previous section, we showed NP-hardness for scoring vectors with an un-
bounded number of different score values. In this section, we discuss scoring vec-
tors with an unbounded number of positions with equal score value. In the first sub-
section, we show NP-hardness for POSSIBLE WINNER for scoring vectors that ful-
fill α2 6= αm−1, and, in the second subsection, we consider the special case that α1 >
α2 = · · · = αm−1 > 0. Note that these two cases cover all scoring vectors with an
unbounded number of equal score values (except plurality and veto): There are three
ways to “violate” α1 > α2 = · · · = αm−1 > 0. First, if one requires α1 = α2, then
one ends up with veto. Second, requiring αm−1 = 0, one arrives at plurality. Third,
requiring α2 6= αm−1, then one ends up with the other case that includes the famous
examples 2-approval and (m− 2)-approval.
6.1. An unbounded number of equal score values and α2 6= αm−1
The scoring vectors considered in this subsection divide into two classes. First,
there are at least two score values that are greater than the “equal score value”. Sec-
ond, there are at least two score values that are smaller than the “equal score value”.
Formally, a size-m scoring vector for the second class looks as follows: there is an i,
with i < m − 2 and an “unbounded” integer x such that αi−x = αi > αi+1. This
property can be used to construct a basic “logical” tool used in the many-one reductions
of this subsection: For two candidates c, c′, having c ≻ c′ in a partial vote implies that
setting c such that it makes less than αi points implies that also c′ makes less than αi
points whereas all candidates placed in the range between i− x and i make exactly αi
points. This can be used to model some implication of the type “c ⇒ c′” in a vote.
For (m − 2)-approval, which will play a prominent role for stating our results, this
condition means that c only has the possibility to make zero points in a vote if also c′
makes zero points in this vote whereas all other candidates make one point.
Most of the reductions of this subsection are from the NP-complete MULTICOL-
ORED CLIQUE (MC) problem [22]:
Given: An undirected graphG = (X1∪X2∪· · ·∪Xk, E) with Xi∩Xj =
∅ for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k and the vertices of Xi induce an independent set for
1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Question: Is there a complete subgraph (clique) of size k?
Here, 1, . . . , k are considered as different colors. Then, the problem is equivalent to
ask for a multicolored clique, that is, a clique that contains one vertex for every color.
To ease the presentation, for any 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ k, we interpret the vertices of Xi as red
vertices and write r ∈ Xi, and the vertices of Xj as green vertices and write g ∈ Xj .
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Reductions from MC are often used to show parameterized hardness results [22].
Intuitively, the different colors give some useful structure to the instance. The general
idea is to construct different types of gadgets. Here, the partial votes realize four kinds
of gadgets. First, gadgets that choose a vertex of every color (vertex selection). Second,
gadgets that choose an edge of every ordered pair of colors, for example, one edge
from green to red and one edge from red to green (edge selection). Third, gadgets that
check the consistency of two selected ordered edges, e.g. does the chosen red-green
candidate refer to the same edge as the choice of the green-red candidate (edge-edge
match)? Finally, gadgets that check whether all edges starting from the same color start
from the same vertex (vertex-edge match). Though reductions from MC have become a
standard tool to obtain hardness results, the reduction given here is not straightforward.
For example, we are not aware of any reduction in the literature for which it is necessary
to employ vertex-edge match gadgets.
We start by giving a reduction from MC that settles the NP-hardness of POSSIBLE
WINNER for (m − 2)-approval. Then we describe how the given construction can
be generalized to work for most of the cases considered in this subsection. The NP-
hardness of the remaining cases will be shown by reductions from EXACT COVER BY
3-SETS.
Lemma 2. POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-hard for (m− 2)-approval.
PROOF. Given an MC-instanceG = (X,E) with X = X1∪X2∪· · ·∪Xk. LetE(i, j)
denote all edges fromE betweenXi andXj . Without loss of generality, we can assume
that there are integers s and t such that |Xi| = s for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, |E(i, j)| = t for all
i, j, and that k is odd since every other instance can be padded easily in this way.
We construct a partial profile P on a set C of candidates such that the distinguished
candidate c ∈ C is a possible winner if and only if there is a size-k clique in G. The
set of candidates C := {c} ⊎ CX ⊎ CE ⊎ D, where ⊎ denotes the disjoint union, is
specified as follows:
• For i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let CiX := {r1, . . . , rk−1 | r ∈ Xi} and CX :=
⋃
iC
i
X .
• For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i 6= j, let
Ci,j := {rg | {r, g} ∈ E(i, j), r ∈ Xi, and g ∈ Xj}
and
C′i,j := {rg
′ | {r, g} ∈ E(i, j), r ∈ Xi, and g ∈ Xj}.
Then, CE := (
⋃
i6=j Ci,j) ⊎ (
⋃
i6=j C
′
i,j), i.e., for every edge {r, g} ∈ E(i, j),
the set CE contains the four candidates rg, rg′, gr, gr′.
• The set D := DX ⊎D1 ⊎D2 is defined as follows. For i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, DiX :=
{cr1, . . . , c
r
k−2 | r ∈ Xi} and DX :=
⋃
iD
i
X . For i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, one has
Di1 := {d
i
1, . . . , d
i
k−2} and D1 :=
⋃
iD
i
1. The set D2 is defined as D2 := {di |
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}}.
We refer to the candidates of CX as vertex-candidates, to the candidates of CE as
edge-candidates, and to the candidates of D as dummy-candidates.
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The partial profile P consists of a set of linear votes V l and a set of partial votes V p.
In each extension of P , the distinguished candidate c gets one point in every vote
from V p (see definition below). Thus, according to Lemma 1, we can set the maximum
partial scores as follows. For every candidate di ∈ D2, smaxp (di) = |V p| − s+ 1, that
is, di must get zero points (take a zero position) in at least s − 1 of the partial votes.
For every remaining candidate c′ ∈ C\({c} ∪ D2), smaxp (c′) = |V p| − 1, that is, c′
must get zero points in at least one of the partial votes.
In the following, we define V p := V1 ∪ V2 ∪ V3 ∪ V4. For all our gadgets only
the last positions of the votes are relevant. Hence, in the partial votes it is sufficient to
explicitly specify the “relevant candidates”. More precisely, we define for all partial
votes that each candidate that does not appear explicitly in the description of a partial
vote is positioned before all candidates that appear in this vote.
The partial votes of V1 realize the edge selection gadgets. Basically, selecting
an ordered edge (r, g) with {r, g} ∈ E means to select the corresponding pair of
edge-candidates rg and rg′. The candidate rg is used for the vertex-edge match
check and rg′ for the edge-edge match check. Now, we give the definition of V1.
For every ordered color pair (i, j), i 6= j, V1 has t − 1 copies of the partial vote
{rg ≻ rg′ | {r, g} ∈ E(i, j)}, that is, one partial vote contains the constraint rg ≻ rg′
for every {r, g} ∈ E(i, j). The idea of this gadget is as follows. For every ordered
color pair we have t edges and t− 1 corresponding votes. Within one vote, one pair of
edge-candidates can get the two available zero positions. Thus, it is possible to set all
but one, namely the selected pair of edge-candidates, to zero positions.
The partial votes of V2 realize the vertex selection gadgets. Here, we will use the
k − 1 candidates corresponding to a selected vertex to do the vertex-edge match for
all edges that are incident in a multicolored clique. Formally, we set V2 := V a2 ∪ V b2
as further defined in the following. Intuitively, in V a2 we select a vertex and in V b2 ,
by a cascading effect, we achieve that all k − 1 candidates that correspond to this
vertex are selected. In V a2 , for every color i, we have s − 1 copies of the partial vote
{r1 ≻ cr1 | r ∈ Xi}. In V b2 , for every color i and for every vertex r ∈ Xi, we have the
following k − 2 votes.
For all odd z ∈ {1, . . . , k − 4}, vr,iz : {crz ≻ crz+1, rz+1 ≻ rz+2}.
For all even z ∈ {2, . . . , k − 3}, vr,iz : {crz ≻ crz+1, diz−1 ≻ diz},
vr,ik−2 : {c
r
k−2 ≻ d
i
k−2, rk−1 ≻ d
i}.
The partial votes of V3 realize the vertex-edge match gadgets. For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k},
for j < i, V3 contains the vote {rg ≻ rj | {r, g} ∈ E, r ∈ Xi, and g ∈ Xj} and,
for j > i, V3 contains the vote {rg ≻ rj−1 | {r, g} ∈ E, r ∈ Xi, and g ∈ Xj}.
The partial votes of V4 realize the edge-edge match gadgets. For every unordered
color pair {i, j}, i 6= j there is the partial vote {rg′ ≻ gr′ | {r, g} ∈ E(i, j), r ∈
Xi, and g ∈ Xj}.
This completes the description of the partial profile. Now, we verify a property
of the construction that is crucial to see the correctness: In total, the number of zero
positions available in the partial votes is exactly equal to the sum of the minimum
number of zero position the candidates of C\{c} must take such that c is a winner. We
denote this property of the construction as tightness. To see the tightness property, we
first compute the number of partial votes:
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V1 : · · · > rg > rg′ for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i 6= j, r ∈ Xi\Q, and g ∈ Xj\Q
V a2 : · · · > r1 > c
r
1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and r ∈ Xi\Q
V b2 : v
r,i
z · · · > rz+1 > rz+2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, r ∈ Xi\Q for all z ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 4}
vr,iz · · · > c
r
z > c
r
z+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, r ∈ Xi\Q for all z ∈ {2, 4, 6, . . . , k − 3}
vr,ik−2 · · · > rk−1 > d
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, r ∈ Xi\Q
vr,iz · · · > c
r
z > c
r
z+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, r ∈ Xi ∩Q for all z ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 4}
vr,iz · · · > d
i
z−1 > d
i
z for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, r ∈ Xi ∩Q for all z ∈ {2, 4, 6, . . . , k − 3}
vr,ik−2 · · · > c
r
k−2 > d
i
k−2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, r ∈ Xi ∩Q
V3 : · · · > rg > rj for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, j < i, r ∈ Xi ∩Q, and g ∈ Xj ∩Q
· · · > rg > rj−1 for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, j > i, r ∈ Xi ∩Q, and g ∈ Xj ∩Q
V4 : · · · > rg′ > gr′ for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i 6= j, r ∈ Xi ∩Q, g ∈ Xj ∩Q
Figure 3: Extension of the partial votes for the MC-instance. Extensions in which candidates that do not
correspond to the solution set Q take the zero positions are highlighted.
|V1|+ |V2|+ |V3|+ |V4| =
k(k − 1)(t− 1) + k(s− 1) + ks(k − 2) + k(k − 1) + k(k − 1)/2 =
t(k2 − k) + s(k2 − k) + k2/2− 3k/2. (1)
Regarding the number of zero positions that must be taken, we first compute the
number of candidates for each subset:
• |CX | = sk(k − 1),
• |CE | = 2tk(k − 1),
• |DX | = sk(k − 2), |D1| = k(k − 2), and |D2| = k.
The candidates of D2 must take at least s−1 zero positions and all other candidates
at least one. Thus, in total the number of zero positions must be at least
sk2 − sk + 2tk2 − 2tk + sk2 − 2ks+ k2 − 2k + k(s− 1) =
2s(k2 − k) + 2t(k2 − k) + k2 − 3k. (2)
Furthermore, there are two zero positions for every partial vote. It is easy to ver-
ify that (1) times two equals (2). Hence, the tightness of the construction is shown.
It directly follows that if there is a candidate that takes more zero positions than de-
sired, then c cannot win in this extension since then at least one zero position must be
“missing” for another candidate.
We can now show the following claim to complete the proof.
Claim: The graph G has a clique of size k if and only if c is a possible winner in P .
“⇒” Given a multicolored clique Q of G of size k. We refer to the vertices and edges
belonging to Q as solution vertices and solution edges, respectively, and to the corre-
sponding candidates as solution candidates. Then, extend the partial profile P as given
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in Figure 3. In the following we argue that in the given extension every candidate takes
the required number of zero positions.
In V1, for every ordered color pair, all pairs of edge-candidates except the pair of
solution edge-candidates are set to the last two positions in one of the t− 1 votes.
In V a2 for every color i, we set all candidates r1 that do not belong to the solution
vertices and the corresponding cr1 to zero positions in one of the votes. In V b2 for every
non-solution vertex r ∈ Xi\Q we set the corresponding candidates rz+1 and rz+2 at
zero positions in the votes vr,iz with odd index z ∈ {1, . . . , k − 4}. In the votes with
even index z ∈ {2, . . . , k−3}, we set the corresponding dummy candidates crz , crz+1 at
zero positions. We further set the candidate rk−1 at a zero position in votes vr,iz for all
the s−1 non-solution vertices of color i, which implies that the dummy candidate di is
placed at s−1 zero positions. Thus, we have “enough” zero positions for all the copies
of the non-solution candidates, the corresponding dummy candidates {cr1, . . . , crk−2 |
r ∈ Xi \ Q}, and di. The remaining votes of V b2 “correspond” to the gadgets for the
solution vertices. Here, we set the candidate pairs crz > crz+1 in the votes with odd
index z ∈ {1, . . . , k − 4} at position zero and the candidate pairs with candidates dip
for p = 1, . . . , k − 2 to zero positions in the votes with even index. Thus, in V2, we
have improved c upon all dummy candidates and upon all candidates corresponding to
non-solution vertices, whereas each candidate corresponding to a solution vertex must
still take a zero position.
Now, it remains to set every candidate corresponding to a solution vertex or a so-
lution edge to a zero position in at least one vote. Due to construction, for a solution
edge {r, g} ∈ E, the two corresponding candidates rg′ and gr′ can be set to zero in
the corresponding vote of V4. And, in V3 the k − 1 vertex-candidates belonging to
every solution vertex can be set to a zero position in combination with the correspond-
ing edge-candidate. Thus, the distinguished candidate c is the winner of the described
extension.
“⇐” Given an extension of P in which c is a winner, we show that the “selected” can-
didates must correspond to a size-k clique. Recall that the number of zero positions
that each candidate must take is “tight” in the sense that if one candidate gets an un-
necessary zero position, then for another candidate there are not enough zero positions
left.
First (edge selection), for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i 6= j, we consider the candidates
of Ci,j . The candidates of Ci,j can take zero positions in one vote of V3 and in t − 1
votes of V1. Since |Ci,j | = t and in the considered votes at most one candidate of Ci,j
can take a zero position, every candidate of Ci,j must take one zero position in one
of these votes. We refer to a candidate that takes the zero position in V3 as solution
candidate rgsol. For every non-solution candidate rg ∈ Ci,j\{rgsol}, its placement
in V1 also implies that rg′ gets a zero position, whereas rg′sol still needs to take one
zero position (which is only possible in V4).
Second, we consider the vertex selection gadgets. Here, analogously to the edge
selection, for every color i, we can argue that in V a2 , out of the set {r1 | r ∈ Xi}, we
have to set all but one candidate to a zero position. The corresponding solution vertex
is denoted as rsol. For every vertex r ∈ Xi\{rsol}, this implies that the corresponding
dummy-candidate cr1 also takes a zero position in V a2 . Now, we show that in V b2 we have
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to set all candidates that correspond to non-solution vertices to a zero position whereas
all candidates corresponding to rsol must appear only at one-positions. Since for every
vertex r ∈ Xi\{rsol}, the vertex cr1 has already a zero position in V a2 , it cannot take
a zero position within V b2 anymore without violating the tightness. In contrast, for the
selected solution candidate rsol, the corresponding candidates crsol1 and rsol1 still need
to take one zero position. The only possibility for crsol1 to take a zero position is within
vote vrsol,i1 by setting c
rsol
1 and c
rsol
2 to the last two positions. Thus, one cannot set rsol2
and rsol3 to a zero position within V2. Hence, the only remaining possibility for rsol2
and rsol3 to get zero points remains within the corresponding votes in V3. This implies
for every non-solution vertex r that r2 and r3 cannot get zero points in V3 and thus
we have to choose to put them on zero positions in the vote vr,i1 from V b2 . The same
principle leads to a cascading effect in the following votes of V b2 : One cannot choose
to set the candidates crsolp for p ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2} to zero positions in votes of V b2
with even index z and thus has to improve upon them in the votes with odd index z.
This implies that all vertex-candidates belonging to rsol only appear in one-positions
within V b2 and that all dummy candidates dip for p ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2} are set to one zero
position. In contrast, for every non-solution vertex r, one has to set the candidates crp,
p ∈ {2, . . . , k−2}, to zero positions in the votes with even index z, and thus in the votes
with odd index z, one has to set all vertex-candidates belonging to r to zero positions.
This further implies that for every non-solution vertex in the last vote of V b2 one has to
set di to a zero position, and since there are exactly s−1 non-solution vertices, di takes
the required number of zero positions. Altogether, all vertex-candidates belonging to a
solution vertex still need to be placed at a zero position in the remaining votes V3 ∪V4,
whereas all dummy candidates of D and the candidates corresponding to the other
vertices must have taken enough zero positions.
Third, consider the vertex-edge match realized in V3. For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i 6= j,
there is only one remaining vote in which rgsol with r ∈ Xi and g ∈ Xj can take a zero
position. Hence, rgsol must take this zero-position. This implies that the corresponding
incident vertex-candidatex is also set to a zero-position in this vote. If x 6= rsoli , then x
has already a zero-position in V2. Hence, this would contradict the tightness and rgsol
and the corresponding vertex must “match”. Furthermore, the construction ensures that
each of the k − 1 candidates corresponding to one vertex appears exactly in one vote
of V3 (for each of the k − 1 candidates, the vote corresponds to edges from different
colors). Hence, c can only be a possible winner if a selected vertex matches with all
selected incident edges.
Finally, we discuss the edge-edge match gadgets. In V4, for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i 6=
j, one still needs to set the solution candidates from Ci,j to zero positions. We show
that this can only be done if the two “opposite” selected edge-candidates match each
other. For two such edges rgsol and grsol, r ∈ Xi, g ∈ Xj , there is only one vote in V4
in which they can get a zero position. If rgsol and grsol refer to different edges, then
in this vote only one of them can get zero points, and thus the other one still beats c.
Altogether, if c is a possible winner, then the selected vertices and edges correspond to
a multicolored clique of size k. ✷
By generalizing the reduction used for Lemma 2, one can show the following.
Theorem 2. An MC-instance I can be reduced to a POSSIBLE WINNER-instance for
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a scoring rule which produces a size-m scoring vector that fulfills the following. There
is an i ≤ m − 1 such that αi−x = · · · = αi−1 > αi with x = f(I). A suitable
poly-type function f can be computed in polynomial time.
PROOF. We describe how to modify the reduction given in the proof of Lemma 2 to
work for the considered cases. For this, let P on C denote a partial profile as con-
structed in the proof of Lemma 2. Since i ≤ m− 1, the position i + 1 must exist. We
set x = f(I) := |C|−2 and fill all positions smaller than i−x and all positions greater
than i + 1 with dummy candidates that are different from candidates in C and that are
beaten by c in every extension. We distinguish the two subcases αi = αi+1 (1a) and
αi 6= αi+1 (1b).
For the case (1a), one can argue in complete analogy to Lemma 2 by “identifying”
the two zero positions of Lemma 2 with position i and i+ 1 and setting the maximum
partial score as follows (which can be done without changing the partial votes due to
Lemma 1). For all di ∈ D2, smaxp (di) = (s − 1) · αi+(|V p| − s + 1) · αi−1 and for
all c′ ∈ C\({c} ∪D2), smaxp (c′) = αi+(|V p| − 1) · αi−1.
For (1b), we need to argue that the tightness argument still holds. For this, we set
the maximum partial scores as follows (which can be done without changing the partial
votes due to Lemma 1). For all di ∈ D2, smaxp (di) = (s−1)·αi+1+(|V p|−s+1)·αi−1
and, for all c′ ∈ C\({c} ∪ D2), smaxp (c′) = αi+(|V p| − 1) · αi−1. Now, in any
extension in which c wins, each candidate in D2 must be placed at least s− 1 times on
position i + 1, and each of the other candidates must be placed on position i or i + 1
at least once. Then again, the number of positions i and i + 1 that still have to be
assigned to candidates is exactly equal to the number of candidates that need to take
these positions, hence, the tightness argument still holds. Thus, the correctness of the
modified reduction can be shown in complete analogy to Lemma 2. ✷
In the following, we consider scoring rules with an unbounded number x of equal
positions for which it holds that there is an i ≥ 2 such that αi > αi+1 = · · · =
αi+x. Parts of the results are based on further extensions of the MC-reduction used to
prove Lemma 2. After that there still remain some cases for which it seems even more
complicated to adapt the MC-reduction. However, for these cases we can make use of
other properties of the scoring rules and settle them by less involved reductions from
EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS. As we will see in Section 7, the following Lemmata 3–6
cover all scoring vectors with i ≥ 2 such that αi > αi+1 = · · · = αi+x.
Lemma 3. An MC-instance I can be reduced to a POSSIBLE WINNER-instance for a
scoring rule which produces a size-m scoring vector that fulfills the following. There
is an i ≥ 2 such that αi > αi+1 = · · · = αi+x with x = f(I) and there is a
position j < i with αj < 2αj+1. A suitable poly-type function f can be computed in
polynomial time.
PROOF. We describe how to modify the MC-reduction given in the proof of Lemma 2
to work for the considered case. For this, let P on C denote a partial profile as con-
structed in the proof of Lemma 2. First, we describe the construction for j = i − 1,
that is, one has αi−1 < 2αi. We construct a partial profile P˜ as follows. We set
x = f(I) = |C| − 2 and all positions < i − 1 and > i + x are filled with dummy
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candidates that are beaten by c in every extension. The positions not filled with dum-
mies “contain” the partial votes of P in “reverse” order: In P all relative orders are
given for pairs of candidates. In P˜ we just “flip” every pair, for example, instead of
having rg ≻ rg′ we have rg′ ≻ rg in V1. We define that all candidates that are not
given explicitly are worse than the given candidates in a vote (instead of being better).
By flipping the order of a pair, we adapt the “logical implication”, for example, instead
of having “if rg makes zero points, then also rg′ makes zero points” in P , we have “if
rg makes αi points, then also rg′ makes at least αi points” in P˜ . Furthermore, we set
the maximum partial scores to smaxp (di) = (s − 1) · αi−1 +(|V p| − s + 1) · αi+1 for
all di ∈ D2 and smaxp (c′) = αi−1+(|V p| − 1) · αi+1 for all c′ ∈ C\({c} ∪D2). Note
that since αi−1 < 2αi, every candidate c′ can take either position i or position i − 1
in one of the partial votes. Then, we can use a “reverse” tightness argument: Since the
positions i and i − 1 must be taken by two candidates in every vote and every candi-
date can take at most one such position (or at most s− 1 such positions for candidates
in D2, respectively), by counting candidates and positions it holds that if every candi-
date of D2 must make αi−1 points exactly (s − 1) times, then every other candidate
must make αi−1 or αi points exactly once. Thus, it remains to show that every di ∈ D
must take position i − 1 in s − 1 of the votes. Assume this is not the case, then there
must be two votes vr,ik−2 and v
r′,i
k−2 with r 6= r′ in which di does not take position i− 1.
Due to construction, the only remaining candidate that can take this position in these
votes is dik−2, but this is not possible due to smaxp (dik−2). Hence, we can use a tightness
argument analogously to Lemma 2. Since we also adapted the logical implication, the
correctness follows in complete analogy to Lemma 2.
The remaining cases (j < i − 1) follow by padding positions within the gadgets.
More precisely, replace each specified pair, e.g. rg′ ≻ rg by rg′ ≻ rg ≻ H with a
dummy set H of size i − (j + 1) and replace αi−1 by αj in the new definitions of the
maximum partial scores. ✷
So far, we settled the NP-hardness for scoring vectors with i ≥ 2 such that αi >
αi+1 = · · · = αi+x if there is a position j < i with αj < 2αj+1. Without the con-
straint αj < 2αj+1, it seems pretty complicated to adapt the tightness property which
is crucial for the MC-reduction. Fortunately, the remaining cases have some differ-
ent properties that allow to settle them by less complicated reductions from EXACT
COVER BY 3-SETS. More precisely, in the following, we give three reductions with
increasing difficulty. (Although all three reductions are self-contained, they might be
easier to understand when reading them in the given order.)
Lemma 4. An X3C-instance I can be reduced to a POSSIBLE WINNER-instance for a
scoring rule which produces a size-m scoring vector that fulfills the following. There
is an i ≥ 2 such that αi > αi+1 = · · · = αi+x with x = f(I) and there is a posi-
tion j < i with αj ≥ 3αi. A suitable poly-type function f for X3C can be computed in
polynomial time.
PROOF. Let (E,S) denote an X3C-instance. Construct a partial profile P on a set of
candidates C. The set C of candidates is defined by C := {c}⊎S ⊎E ⊎H ⊎D where
c denotes the distinguished candidate c, S := {sz | Sz ∈ S}, E the set of candidates
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that represent the elements of the universe, and H and D contain disjoint candidates
such that the following hold. We define H :=
⊎|S|
z=1Hz with |Hz| = i − j for all z ∈
{1, . . . , |S|} needed to “pad” some positions relevant to the construction and |D| =
m− |S| − |E| − |H | − 1 needed to pad irrelevant positions. We refer to the candidates
from S as subset candidates and to the candidates from E as element candidates. Set
f((E,S)) := |C \ D| − (i − j). For 1 ≤ z ≤ |S|, let Sz = {ez1, ez2, ez3}. The
partial profile P consists of a set of linear votes and a set of partial votes V p. In all
votes of V p, we pad all irrelevant positions, i.e. all positions smaller than j and greater
than j − 1 + |C \D| by fixing candidates from D (omitted in the further description).
The set V p consists of |S| − |E|/3 copies of the vote
s1 ≻ H1 ≻ C\(S ∪H), s2 ≻ H2 ≻ C\(S ∪H), . . . , s|S| ≻ H|S| ≻ C\(S ∪H)
denoted as V p1 and the following three votes, denoted as V
p
2 (z), for every sz ∈ S
v1z : H1 ≻ {sz, ez1} ≻ C\({sz, ez1} ∪H1),
v2z : H1 ≻ {sz, ez2} ≻ C\({sz, ez2} ∪H1),and
v3z : H1 ≻ {sz, ez3} ≻ C\({sz, ez3} ∪H1).
The basic idea of this construction is that in V p1 one has to set all but |E|/3 “subset”
candidates to position j whereas the remaining candidates will be able to take a position
greater than i in all votes from V p1 . Therefore, the remaining |E|/3 subset candidates
can make αj −αi+1 points more than the other candidates within the remaining votes.
This will enable them to shift their corresponding element candidates to position i+ 1
by taking position i. Since αj > 3 · αi, they will be able to shift all three element
candidates, respectively. To realize the basic idea, we adapt the maximum partial scores
appropriately. For e ∈ E, let ne denote the number of subsets in S which contain e.
Then according to Lemma 1, we can cast the linear votes such that the following holds:
• smaxp (sz) = αj +(|V
p| − 1) · αi+1, for all sz ∈ S,
• smaxp (e) = (ne − 1) · αi +(|V
p| − ne + 1) · αi+1, for all e ∈ E, and
• all other candidates are beaten by c in every extension.
We show that c is a possible winner in P if and only if there is an exact 3-cover
for (E,S):
Assume there is an exact 3-cover Q. Then one extends P by setting each sz
with Sz /∈ Q at position j in one vote from V p1 and the corresponding candidates
from Hz to the positions j + 1, . . . , i in the same vote. Furthermore, set sz to posi-
tion i + 1 in v1z , v2z , and v3z . Now, we have that every sz with Sz /∈ Q takes position j
in one vote and a position greater than i in all remaining votes and thus is beaten by c.
This also means that in V p1 all positions ≤ i are filled and thus every candidate sz
with Sz ∈ Q takes a position greater than i in all votes from V p1 . Thus, the remaining
votes can be extended by setting every sz with Sz ∈ Q to position i in v1z , v2z , and v3z .
Since αj ≥ 3αi, the maximum partial score of sz is not exceeded. Because Q is an
exact 3-cover, all element candidates are shifted to position i + 1 in one vote and thus
are beaten by c. Hence, c is a winner in the described extension.
For the other direction, consider an extension of P in which c wins. Due to con-
struction, in V p1 only subset candidates from S can take position j. Because of the
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maximum partial scores, position j must be taken by different candidates from S in
the |S| − |E|/3 votes of V 1p . We denote these candidates as non-solution candidates
and the remaining |E|/3 candidates from S as solution candidates. Due to smaxp (sz),
every non-solution candidate must take position i + 1 in all remaining votes and thus
the corresponding element candidates must make αi points in the corresponding votes.
Hence, there remain only |E|/3 solution candidates that have to “shift” the |E| ele-
ment candidates to position i + 1. Since every solution candidate can shift at most 3
candidates, the solution candidates must correspond to an exact 3-cover. ✷
In the following lemma, we consider a more specific type of scoring vector in the
sense that there are only two score values greater than zero. This restriction allows us
to find an easy way to “lift” the condition “αj ≥ 3 ·αi” for two special types of scoring
rules that will be sufficient for the proof of the main result in Section 7. Compared to
the reduction from the previous lemma, for the following cases we also choose a set of
“solution subset candidates” within the first part of the partial votes, but we will need
some additional gadgetry to be able to “shift” the corresponding element candidates.
Lemma 5. An X3C-instance I can be reduced to a POSSIBLE WINNER-instance for
a scoring rule which produces a size-m scoring vector (α1, α2, 0, . . . , 0) with 3α2 >
α1 > 2α2 and m = f(I) + 2. A suitable poly-type function f can be computed in
polynomial time.
PROOF. Let (E,S) denote an X3C-instance. Construct a partial profile P on a set of
candidates C as follows. The set of candidates consists of a distinguished candidate c,
a set S := {si | Si ∈ S} (the subset candidates), a set D := {di | Si ∈ S},
the set E (the element candidates), a candidate x, and H := {h1, . . . , h|S|}. Set
f((E,S)) := |C| − 2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|, let Si = {ei1, ei2, ei3}. The partial profile P
consists of a set of linear votes and a set of partial votes V p. The set V p consists
of |S| − |E|/3 copies of the vote
s1 ≻ h1 ≻ C\(S ∪H), s2 ≻ h2 ≻ C\(S ∪H), . . . , s|S| ≻ h|S| ≻ C\(S ∪H)
denoted as V p1 and the following three votes for every Si ∈ S
v1i : di ≻ ei1 ≻ C\{di, ei1, si}, si ≻ C\{di, ei1, si}
v2i : x ≻ {di, ei2} ≻ C\{di, ei2, x}
v3i : x ≻ {di, ei3} ≻ C\{di, ei3, x}
Let ne denote the number of subsets in which e occurs. Then, due to Lemma 1, we
can set the maximum partial scores as follows:
• smaxp (si) = α1 for all si ∈ S,
• smaxp (di) = 3 · α2 for all di ∈ D,
• smaxp (e) = (ne − 1) · α2 for all e ∈ E,
• all other candidates are beaten by c in every extension.
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We show that c is a possible winner in P if and only if there is an exact 3-cover
for (E,S):
Assume there is an exact 3-cover Q for (E,S). Then we extend P as follows. For
every Si /∈ Q, si takes position 1 and hi takes position 2 in one vote from V p1 and si
takes position 3 in v1i . The corresponding di takes position 3 in v2i and v3i . Clearly,
for Si /∈ Q, smaxp (si) is not exceeded, sp(di) = α1 < 3α2 = smaxp (di), and within V
p
1
all first positions are fixed. For every solution set Si ∈ Q, we set si to a position greater
than 2 in all votes from V p1 and to the first position in v1i . Since this implies that di takes
the second position in v1i , this enables us to set di to the second position in v2i and v3i
without violating smaxp (di). Since Q is an exact 3-cover, all corresponding element
candidates are shifted to the third position once and for every element candidate the
maximum partial score is not exceeded. Hence, c is a winner.
To see the other direction, assume there is an extension in which c wins. In V p1 , the
first positions can only be taken by candidates from S. Since each si ∈ S can get α1
points exactly once, |S| − |E|/3 different subset candidates from S have to be placed
on the first position. Let the set consisting of these candidates be denoted by S′. Every
candidate si from S′ has exploited its maximum partial score and therefore has to be
placed on the third position in v1i . This implies that the corresponding candidate di
takes the first position in v1i . Since α1 > 2α2 and smaxp (di) = 3α2, di has to take
the third position in both v2i and v3i . Hence, for si ∈ S′, the corresponding element
candidates ei1, ei2, ei3 receiveα2 points each. However, each of the element candidates
from E has to be placed on position 3 at least once due to its maximum partial score.
This can only be in the remaining partial votes, that is, all v1i , v2i , v3i with si ∈ S \ S′.
Since |S \ S′| = |E|/3, one must shift one element candidate in each of these votes.
For this, the only possibility is to set every si ∈ S \ S′ to position 1 in v1i , and the
corresponding candidate di takes the second position in v2i and v3i . Since c wins, all |E|
element candidates must get shifted to position 3. Hence, S\S′ corresponds to an exact
3-cover of (E,S). ✷
Finally, we settle the NP-hardness for a specific scoring vector.
Lemma 6. An X3C-instance I can be reduced to a POSSIBLE WINNER-instance for a
scoring rule which produces a size-m scoring vector (2, 1, 0, . . . , 0) for m = f(I)+2.
A suitable poly-type function f can be computed in polynomial time.
PROOF. Let (E,S) denote an X3C-instance. Construct a partial profile P on a set of
candidates C as follows. The set of candidates consists of a distinguished candidate c,
a set S := {si | Si ∈ S} (the subset candidates), D := {di | Si ∈ S}, T := {ti |
Si ∈ S}, E (the element candidates), a candidate y, and X := {x1, . . . , x|S|−|E|/3}.
Set f((E,S)) := |C| − 2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|, let Si = {ei1, ei2, ei3}. The partial
profile P consists of a set of linear votes and a set of partial votes V p. The set V p :=
V p1 ∪ V
p
2 ∪ V
p
3 is further defined as follows. The set V
p
1 consists of |S| − |E|/3 copies
of the partial vote
s1 ≻ t1 ≻ C\(S ∪ T ), s2 ≻ t2 ≻ C\(S ∪ T ), . . . , s|S| ≻ t|S| ≻ C\(S ∪ T ).
The set V p2 consists of |S| − |E|/3 copies of the partial vote
y ≻ T ≻ C\(T ∪ {y})
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V p1 : si > ti > . . . for Si /∈ Q
V p2 : y > ti > . . . for Si /∈ Q
V p3 : v
1
i di > ei1 > si > . . . for Si /∈ Q
v2i y > ei2 > di > . . . for Si /∈ Q
v3i ei3 > xq > ti . . . for Si /∈ Q and different q
v1i si > di > ei1 > . . . for Si ∈ Q
v2i y > di > ei2 > . . . for Si ∈ Q
v3i ti > ei3 > . . . for Si ∈ Q
Table 3: Extension for the X3C-reduction for the case (2, 1, 0, . . . ). The remark “different q” means that for
i 6= i′ with Si /∈ Q and Si′ /∈ Q one chooses two different candidates from X . Extensions corresponding
to non-solution candidates are highlighted.
and V p3 contains the following three votes for every Si ∈ S
v1i : di ≻ ei1 ≻ C\{di, ei1, si}, si ≻ C\{di, ei1, si}
v2i : y ≻ {di, ei2} ≻ C\{di, ei2, y}
v3i : {ti, ei3} ≻ C\({ti, ei3} ∪X)
Let ne denote the number of subsets in which e occurs and ne,3 the number of
subsets in which e is denoted as ei3 for i ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}. Then, using Lemma 1, we set
the maximum partial scores as follows:
• smaxp (si) = s
max
p (ti) = s
max
p (di) = 2 for i ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}
• smaxp (xi) = 1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , |S| − |E|/3}
• smaxp (e) = 2ne,3 + (ne − ne,3)− 1 for e ∈ E
• the candidate y is beaten by c in every extension
We show that c is a possible winner in P if and only if there is an exact 3-cover
for (E,S):
Assume there is an exact 3-cover Q for (E,S). Then we extend P as given in
Table 3. For every Si /∈ Q, si takes the first position in one vote from V p1 and makes
zero points in all remaining votes. The corresponding ti takes the second position
in one vote from V p1 and one vote from V
p
2 and makes zero points in all remaining
votes. Hence, c beats these si and ti and the votes from V p1 and V
p
2 are fixed. For
every Si /∈ Q, we extend v3i by setting a different candidate from X at the second
position such that none of them is put on this position twice, and hence c also beats
every candidate from X . For every Si ∈ Q, di, ti and si make exactly 2 points in V p3
and thus are beaten by c as well. It remains to consider the element candidates. To
this end, note that a candidate e ∈ E is beaten by c if there is an i such that e takes
position 3 in v1i or v2i or takes position 2 in v3i . Since Q is an exact 3-cover and all
candidates corresponding to subsets from Q are shifted to the right in one vote, c wins
in the given extension.
To see the other direction, assume there is an extension in which c wins. Let G1 :=
{v1i | 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|}, G
2 := {v2i | 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|}, and G3 := {v3i | 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|}. We
start by arguing that at most 2/3 · |E| candidates from E can make zero points in a vote
from G1∪G2. For any i, at most two element candidates, namely ei1 and ei2 can make
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zero points in G1 ∪G2. More precisely, due to smaxp (di), if si takes the first position in
v1i , then ei1 and ei2 can take the third position and if si takes the second position, then
only ei1 can be shifted to the third position, since di takes the first position in v1i and
has exploited its maximum partial score. Thus, the number of points that all candidates
from S can make within V p3 is an upper bound for the number of element candidates
that can be shifted. Since only candidates from S can take the first positions in V p1 ,
|V p1 | = |S|−|E|/3, and smaxp (si) = 2, the candidates from S can make at most 2/3|E|
points in V p3 . Thus, there are at most 2/3|E| element candidates that can take a position
with zero points in G1∪G2. Thus, due to smaxp (e), in G3 one must shift (at least) |E|/3
candidates to the second position (Observation 1). In the following, we show that the
only way to do so leads to an extension in which exactly |E|/3 candidates si from S
make zero points in V p1 and the corresponding ti make zero points in V
p
1 ∪V
p
2 whereas
all other candidates from S∪T have already accomplished their maximum partial score
in V p1 ∪ V
p
2 (Claim 1). This means that the element candidates that are shifted to the
right correspond to exactly |E|/3 subsets Si ∈ S. Since every element candidate must
be shifted at least once, these subsets must form an exact 3-cover in (E,S).
We use a tightness criterion (analogously to the MC-reduction from Lemma 2) to
prove Claim 1. To this end, we show that the score of all positions that must be filled
equals the sum of the maximum partial scores of all candidates. Again, it directly
follows that a candidate c′ ∈ C\{c} cannot make less than smaxp (c′) points since oth-
erwise there must be another candidate that beats c. Now, we show the tightness. The
total number of votes is
|V p1 |+ |V
p
2 |+ |V
p
3 | = |S| − |E|/3 + |S| − |E|/3 + 3|S| = 5|S| − 2/3|E|.
In V p2 and V
p
3 , candidate y is already fixed at the first position in 2|S| − 1/3|E| votes
and since in every vote 3 points have to be given, there are 3 · (5|S| − 2/3|E|) − 2 ·
(2|S| − 1/3|E|) = 11|S| − 4/3|E| points for the remaining candidates left. The sum
of the maximum partial scores from all candidates from S ∪ T ∪D ∪X ∪ E is
3 · 2 · |S|+ |S| − |E|/3 + 2|S|+ 2|S| − |E| = 11|S| − 4/3|E|.
To see this, note that clearly
∑
e∈E ne,3 = |S| and
∑
e∈E ne = 3|S|. Thus, the
tightness follows.
Now, we finally show the correctness of Claim 1. Due to the tightness, the |S| −
|E|/3 candidates from X must take position 2 in |S| − |E|/3 votes from G3. Thus,
there remain |E|/3 second positions in G3 that are not fixed. Note that due to tightness,
a candidate ei3 cannot take the third position in v3i . Hence, if the remaining second po-
sitions are not taken by candidates from E, we shift less than |E|/3 candidates in G3,
a contradiction to Observation 1. Hence, these positions must be taken by candidates
from E and thus all second positions within G3 are fixed. This implies that every can-
didate ti from T must take either the first or the third position in v3i . More precisely,
since |E|/3 candidates from E take a second position there must be |E|/3 candidates
from T that take the first positions within the corresponding votes. However, a can-
didate from T can only take the first position if it makes zero points in V p1 ∪ V
p
2 .
Hence, there must be |E|/3 candidates from T , denoted as T ′, that make zero points
in V p1 ∪ V
p
2 and, due to tightness, all remaining candidates from T must make 2 points
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in V p1 ∪ V
p
2 . A candidate ti ∈ T can make at most one point in V
p
1 since due to the
condition “si ≻ ti” it shifts si to the first position (and smaxp (si) = 2). Hence, making
two points within V p1 ∪ V
p
2 implies that ti must make one point in V
p
1 and one point
in V p2 and that the corresponding si must make 2 points in V
p
1 . This fixes all positions
in V p1 ∪V
p
2 and since a candidate si with ti ∈ T ′ clearly makes zero points in V
p
1 ∪V
p
2 ,
the correctness of Claim 1 follows. Altogether, we have that {Si | ti ∈ T ′} forms an
exact 3-cover for (E,S). ✷
6.2. Scoring vectors with α1 > α2 = · · · = αm−1 > 0
In this subsection, we consider scoring rules defined by scoring vectors that ful-
fill α1 > α2 = · · · = αm−1 > 0. Although quite special, these rules might be of inter-
est of their own. They can be considered as a direct combination of the very common
plurality and veto rules where one allows to weight the contribution of the plurality or
veto part. For example, by using (10, 1, . . . , 1, 0) the “plurality” part would have more
influence to the outcome, whereas for (10, 9, . . . , 9, 0) the “veto” part would be more
important. To show NP-hardness, we give two types of many-one reductions from
X3C; one for the case α1 < 2 · α2 and one for the case α1 > 2 · α2. As mentioned be-
fore, the case α1 = 2 · α2 remains open. Intuitively, for all other cases we make use of
the “asymmetry” of the differences of the score values, that is, by shifting a candidate
from the first to the second position one decreases its score by a different amount than
by shifting it from the last but one to the last position. In the two following proofs, the
position in a linear order in which a candidate gets α1 points is denoted as top position,
a position in which a candidate gets α2 points as middle position, and the position in
which a candidate gets zero points as last position.
Theorem 3. An X3C-instance I can be reduced to a POSSIBLE WINNER-instance for
a scoring rule which produces a size-m scoring vector satisfying the conditions α1 >
α2 = αm−1 > αm = 0 and α1 < 2 · α2 for m = f(I) + 2. A suitable poly-type
function f can be computed in polynomial time.
PROOF. Let (E,S) denote an X3C-instance. We construct a partial profileP for which
the distinguished candidate c ∈ C is a possible winner if and only if (E,S) is a yes-
instance. The set of candidates is C := {c, h} ⊎ {si, di, ti | Si ∈ S} ⊎ E. The
partial profile P consists of a set of partial votes V p and a set of linear orders V l.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|, let Si = {ei1, ei2, ei3}. Then the set of partial votes V p := V p1 ∪ V
p
2
is given by the following subsets. The set V p1 consists of |E|/3 copies of the partial
vote
h ≻ C \ {h, s1, . . . , s|S|} ≻ {s1, . . . , s|S|}.
For every i ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}, the set V p2 contains the three votes
v1i : h ≻ C\{h, si, di} ≻ {si, di},
v2i : ei1 ≻ C\{ei1, ti, di} ≻ ti, and
v3i : ei2 ≻ C\{ei2, ei3, ti} ≻ ei3.
Now, we pass on to the definitions of the maximum partial scores. To this end, for
a candidate e corresponding to an element e ∈ E (referred to as element candidate),
let ne,1+2 denote the number of subsets from S in which e is identical with ei1 or ei2.
Due to Lemma 1, we can cast the linear votes such that the following hold:
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V p1 : h > . . . > si Si ∈ Q
V p2 : v
1
i h > . . . > si > di Si ∈ Q
v2i di > ei1 > . . . > ti Si ∈ Q
v3i ti > ei2 > . . . > ei3 Si ∈ Q
v1i h > . . . > di > si Si /∈ Q
v2i ei1 > . . . > ti > di Si /∈ Q
v3i ei2 > . . . > ei3 > ti Si /∈ Q
Figure 4: Extension for the case α1 > α2 = αm−1 > 0 and α1 < 2 · α2. Extensions for candidates that
do not correspond to subsets belonging to the solution set Q are highlighted.
• smaxp (si) = (|V
p| − 1) · α2,
• smaxp (di) = s
max
p (ti) = α1+(|V
p| − 2) · α2,
• smaxp (e) = (|V
p| − ne,1+2 + 1) · α2+(ne,1+2 − 1) · α1,
• h is beaten by c in every extension.
The maximum partial scores of the element candidates are set such that every el-
ement candidate has to be “shifted” to the right at least once. More precisely, if a
candidate e took the first position in all votes in which it is identical with ei1 or ei2 and
the second position in all remaining votes (including the votes in which it is identical
with ei3), then s(e) = (|V p| − ne,1+2) · α2+ne,1+2 · α1 > smaxp (e) since α1 > α2.
However, if, for any i, ti or di are inserted at the first position in one of the votes in
which e appears, then e makes at least α1−α2 points less and thus is beaten by c. We
denote this as Observation 2. Now, we show the correctness of the construction.
Claim: Candidate c is a possible winner in P if and only if (E,S) is a yes-instance.
“⇐”: Let Q denote an exact 3-cover for (E,S). Then extend P as displayed in Fig-
ure 4. More precisely, within V p1 every candidate si with Si ∈ Q takes the last po-
sition in exactly one of the |E|/3 votes. Then, the candidates make the following
points within the extension of the partial votes. Every si takes the last position in one
vote and middle positions in all other votes and thus makes exactly smaxp (si) points.
For Si ∈ Q, every candidate ti and every candidate di takes one first and one last
position, and thus, s(di) = s(ti) = α1+(|V p| − 2) · α2 = smaxp (di) = smaxp (ti).
In the corresponding votes every element candidate is shifted once since Q is an ex-
act 3-cover and thus is beaten by c due to Observation 2. Clearly, for Si /∈ Q, si is
beaten by c as well. It remains to consider di and ti with Si /∈ Q. Here, one has
s(di) = (|V p| − 1) · α2 < smaxp (di) and s(ti) = (|V p| − 1) · α2 < smaxp (ti). Hence, c
beats all other candidates and wins.
“⇒”: Consider an extension in which c wins. Due to smaxp (si), every candidate si
must take the last position in at least one of the votes. Since |V p1 | = |E|/3, at most
|E|/3 candidates can take a last position in V p1 ; denote the set of them by S′. Hence at
least |S|− |E|/3 candidates si must take the last position in v1i . Now, we show that for
these candidates the corresponding element candidates cannot be shifted to the right
in v2i or v3i . Since si takes the last position in v1i , di already makes (|V p| − 1) · α2 in
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the extended partial votes without v2i . Hence, di must take the last position in v2i since
otherwise s(di) = |V p| · α2 > smaxp (di) because α1 < 2α2. This implies that ei1 is
not shifted and that ti takes a middle position in v2i . Now, for ti it follows analogously
that ti must take the last position in v3i and thus neither ei2 nor ei3 is shifted. Alto-
gether, this means that all element candidates must be shifted by candidates from S′.
Every si ∈ S′ can shift three candidates by setting si in the last position in v1i and
di and ti to the first positions in v2i and v3i , respectively. Since there are |E| element
candidates, it follows that |S′| = |E|/3 and that all si ∈ S′ must shift disjoint sets of
element candidates. Hence, S′ corresponds to an exact 3-cover for (E,S). ✷
In the remainder of this subsection, we consider the case that α1 > 2 · α2. We also
give a reduction from X3C. Note that the previous proof cannot be transferred directly
and thus we give a modified construction for which it will be more laborious to show
the correctness.
Theorem 4. An X3C-instance I can be reduced to a POSSIBLE WINNER-instance for
a scoring rule which produces a size-m-scoring vector satisfying the conditions α1 >
α2 = αm−1 > αm = 0 and α1 > 2 · α2 for m = f(I) + 2. A suitable poly-type
function f can be computed in polynomial time.
PROOF. Let (E,S) denote an X3C-instance. Let k denote the size of a solution
for (E,S), that is, k := |E|/3, and t := |S|. We construct a partial profile P for which
the distinguished candidate c ∈ C is a possible winner if and only if (E,S) is a yes-
instance. The set of candidates is C := S ⊎D⊎E ⊎{c, h} with S := {si | 1 ≤ i ≤ t}
(the subset candidates) and D := {di | 1 ≤ i ≤ t}, and E (the element candidates).
Very roughly, the basic idea of the reduction is as follows. There are three subsets
of partial votes, in the first subset V p1 one “selects” t − k subset candidates from S
that do not correspond to an exact 3-cover and in the second subset V p2 one selects k
subset candidates that correspond to an exact 3-cover. Selecting hereby means that a
solution subset candidate gets zero points in one vote of V p2 whereas every non-solution
candidate gets α1 points in a vote of V p1 . Hence, a solution candidate can make more
points than a non-solution candidate in the third subset V p3 . Thus, a solution candidate
can take a top position in V p3 which yields a cascading effect that makes it possible to
shift the corresponding element candidates such that they do not beat the distinguished
candidate c.
Formally, the partial profile P consists of a set of partial votes V p and a set of
linear orders V l. For 1 ≤ i ≤ t, let Si = {ei1, ei2, ei3}, then the set of partial
votes V p := V p1 ∪ V
p
2 ∪ V
p
3 is given by the following subsets.
V p1 : t− k copies of the partial vote S ≻ C\(S ∪ {h}) ≻ h
V p2 : k copies of the partial vote h ≻ C\(S ∪ {h}) ≻ S
V p3 : for 1 ≤ i ≤ t the three partial votes wi1: di ≻ C\{di, ei1, si} ≻ ei1
wi2: h ≻ C\{di, ei2, h} ≻ {ei2, di}
wi3 : h ≻ C\{di, ei3, h} ≻ {ei3, di}
Note that inwi1, candidate si can be inserted at any position. The distinguished can-
didate c makes α2 points in every partial vote from V p. Hence, according to Lemma 1,
we can set the linear orders of V l such that the following holds. For i = 1, . . . , t,
smaxp (si) = (|V
p| − 2) · α2+α1,
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V p1 : si > C\{si, h} > h ∀si with Si /∈ S ′
V p2 : h > C\{si, h} > si ∀si with Si ∈ S ′
V p3 : w
i
1 di > C\{si, di} > si ∀si with Si /∈ S ′
wi2 h > C\{di, h} > di ∀si with Si /∈ S ′
wi3 h > C\{di, h} > di ∀si with Si /∈ S ′
wi1 si > C\{si, ei1} > ei1 ∀si with Si ∈ S ′
wi2 h > C\{ei2, h} > ei2 ∀si with Si ∈ S ′
wi3 h > C\{ei3, h} > ei3 ∀si with Si ∈ S ′
Figure 5: Extension of V p for an exact 3-cover S′ ⊆ S . The middle positions are not given explicitly since
the order of the candidates is irrelevant. Extensions for candidates which do not belong to the solution set S′
are highlighted.
smaxp (di) = (|V
p| − 2) · α2 +α1−z
with z = α1 mod α2 if α1 < 3α2, and z = α2, otherwise4. Note that it holds
that α2 ≥ z and
α1−z ≥ 2α2 . (3)
For all e ∈ E, smaxp (e) = (|V p| − 1) · α2, that is, e must have the last position in one
of the partial votes. And, smaxp (h) ≥ |V p| · α1, that is, h can beat c in no extension.
We now prove the following claim.
Claim: Candidate c is a possible winner of (V,C) if and only if (E,S) is a yes-instance
for X3C.
“⇐”: Let S′ ⊆ S denote an exact 3-cover for (E,S). Then, we extend the partial
profile as follows (Figure 5). If Si ∈ S′, then si is placed at the last position in one
vote of V p2 and at a middle position in all other votes from V
p
1 ∪ V
p
2 . If Si /∈ S′,
then si is placed at the first position in one of the votes in V p1 and at a middle po-
sition in all other votes from V p1 ∪ V
p
2 . This is possible since there are t − k top
position and k last positions that can be taken by candidates from S in V p1 ∪ V
p
2 .
In V p3 , every candidate si with Si ∈ S ′ is placed at the top position and the corre-
sponding element candidates ei2, ei3 at the last position in the respective votes. Every
candidate si with Si /∈ S ′ is placed at the last position and the corresponding element
candidates ei2, ei3 are placed at a middle position.
In the described extension, the candidates make the following points in V p. Every
candidate si ∈ S takes exactly one top position and exactly one last position in V p.
Hence s(si) = smaxp (si). For the candidates of D one has to distinguish two cases.
First, if Si /∈ S, then, s(di) = (|V p| − 3) · α2+α1 ≤ smaxp (di) since α2 ≥ z. Second,
if Si ∈ S, then s(di) = |V p| ·α2 = (|V p|−2) ·α2+2α2 ≤ (|V p|−2) ·α2+α1−z =
4Note that this maximum partial score does not exactly fulfill the conditions of Lemma 1 if z 6= α2.
However, the construction can be easily extended to work for this case as well. More precisely, in this
case z = α1−⌊α1 /α2⌋ ·α2 and ⌊α1 /α2⌋ ≤ 3. Thus, in the construction given in the proof of Lemma 1
one can add α1 and “subtract” α2 as often as required. The subtraction can be accomplished by changing
the role of the dummy “d” and di within a block.
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smaxp (di) because of Inequality (3). Finally, we have to consider the candidates fromE.
Since for every Si in the 3-cover, the corresponding element candidates ei1, ei2, and ei3
get at the last position, every candidate ofE takes one last and |V p|−1 middle positions
and thus makes (|V p|−1)·α2 points. It follows that c wins in the considered extension.
“⇒”: In an extension of V in which c is the winner, every element candidate from E
must take the last position in one vote of V p. This is only possible in V p3 since every
element candidate is already fixed at a middle position in V p1 ∪ V
p
2 . More precisely,
for every i, ei1 gets a last position if si is inserted at a middle or the top position in
the corresponding vote wi1 and ei2/ei3 can get a last position only if di takes a middle
position in the corresponding vote wi2/wi3.
To find out what this means for the other candidates, we have to go into details here.
For i = 1, . . . , t, let bi denote the “benefit”, i.e., the maximum number of element
candidates that can be put at a last position in V p3 depending on where si is placed
in wi1. Then, we can show the following.
Observation 3:
1. bi = 3 if si is placed in a top position in wi1.
2. bi = 1 if si is placed in a middle position in wi1.
3. bi = 0 if si is placed in a last position in wi1.
To see Observation 3, note that if si is on the top position in wi1, then di can take
the middle position in wi2 or wi3 since the corresponding score s(di) = |V p| · α2 ≤
smaxp (di). Thus, all three element candidates can be shifted to the last position. If si
is not placed on the top, but in the middle position, then ei1 is still shifted to the last
position, but di must take the last position in wi2 or wi3 and thus neither ei2 nor ei3 can
have a last position in wi2 or wi3. To see this, assume that di has the top position in wi1
and a middle position in wi2 or wi3, then
s(di) ≥ |V
p
1 ∪ V
p
2 | · α2+(|V
p
3 | − 2) · α2+α1 = (|V
p| − 2) · α2+α1 > smaxp (di),
a contradiction. If si is placed on the last position in wi1, then ei1 cannot take the last
position in V p3 , and neither can ei2 and ei3, because di takes the first position in wi1 and
gets α1 points and has to take the last position in bothwi2 and wi3 by the same argument
as before.
In the following, we show that in an extension in which c wins, in V p1 there must be
t − k different subset candidates si that take the top position and each of the remain-
ing k (solution) candidates of S must take one last position in V p2 . It directly follows
by Observation 3 that for all non-solution candidates we must have that bi = 0 and
thus every solution candidate must shift the three corresponding element candidates
that must be different from the element candidates corresponding to the other solution
candidates.
For every i, let ti denote the number of top positions that si takes within V p1 and li
the number of last positions that si takes within V p2 . Observe that the following condi-
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tions must hold.
t∑
i=1
li = k,
t∑
i=1
ti = t− k, since every position must be taken, (4)
t∑
i=1
bi ≥ 3k, since there are 3k element candidates and each
one must take at least one last position.
In the following, our strategy consists of three steps:
• We first investigate the dependencies of li, ti, and bi upon each other. For that
sake, we distinguish the cases li = 0, li = 1, and li ≥ 2.
• Second, based on these case distinctions, we can show that the case li ≥ 2 is not
possible, that is, every si can have at most one last position in V i2 . This will need
the most technical effort and will directly imply ti ≤ 1 for all i.
• Third, we show that there is no candidate si with li = ti = 1, which will imply
that only candidates with li = 1 contribute with a positive benefit and can place
their element candidates at a last position. Since there are only k such candidates,
they must correspond to an exact 3-cover.
First step. We show some dependencies of li, ti, and bi by systematically enumer-
ating all possible cases. (In the argumentation that follows the case distinction we are
only interested in upper bounds of bi. Hence, we omit to show lower bounds.)
Case I: li = 0 a) if ti = 0, then bi ≤ 1,
b) if ti = 1, then bi = 0,
c) ti ≥ 2 is not possible.
Proof of Case I:
Ia) (li = ti = 0): Assume bi = 3, i.e., si is on the top position in wi1 due to Observa-
tion 3. Then s(si) = (|V p| − 1)α2+α1 > smaxp (si), a contradiction, hence bi ≤ 1.
Ib) (li = 0, ti = 1): Assume bi = 1, i.e., si is on a middle position in wi1 due to Obser-
vation 3. Then s(si) = (|V p| − 1)α2 +α1 > smaxp (si), a contradiction, hence bi = 0.
Ic) (li = 0, ti ≥ 2): Assume si takes the last position in wi1, that is, si makes as few
points as possible within this case. Then,
s(si) = (|V
p| − ti − 1)α2+ti α1
> (|V p| − ti − 1 + 2(ti − 1))α2+α1
> smaxp (si),
a contradiction, hence this case is not possible.
Case II: li = 1 a) if ti = 0, then bi ≤ 3,
b) if ti = 1, then bi ≤ 1,
c) ti ≥ 2 is not possible.
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Proof of Case II:
IIa) (li = 1, ti = 0), trivial upper bound.
IIb) (li = ti = 1) Assume bi = 3, i.e., si is on the top position in wi1 due to Observa-
tion 3. Then s(si) = (|V p| − 3)α2+2α1 > smaxp (si), a contradiction, hence bi ≤ 1.
IIc) (li = 1, ti ≥ 2): Even if si takes the last position in wi1 one has
s(si) = (|V
p| − ti − 2)α2+ti α1
> (|V p| − ti − 2 + 2(ti − 1))α2+α1
= (|V p|+ ti − 4)α2+α1
≥ smaxp (si),
a contradiction, hence this case is not possible.
Case III: li ≥ 2 a) if ti = li, then bi = 0,
b) if ti = li − 1, then bi ≤ 1,
c) if ti ≤ li − 2, then bi ≤ 3,
d) ti > li is not possible.
Proof of Case III:
IIIa) (li ≥ 2, ti = li): Assume bi = 1, i.e., si is on a middle position in wi1 due to
Observation 3. Then
s(si) = (|V
p| − ti − li)α2+ti α1
= (|V p| − 2ti)α2+ti α1
> (|V p| − 2ti + 2(ti − 1))α2+α1
= (|V p| − 2)α2+α1
= smaxp (si),
a contradiction, hence bi = 0.
IIIb) (li ≥ 2, ti = li − 1): Assume bi = 3, i.e., si is on the top position in wi1 due to
Observation 3, then
s(si) = (|V
p| − ti − li − 1)α2+(ti + 1)α1
= (|V p| − 2ti − 2)α2+(ti + 1)α1
> (|V p| − 2ti − 2 + 2ti)α2 +α1
= (|V p| − 2)α2+α1
= smaxp (si),
a contradiction, hence bi ≤ 1.
IIIc) (li ≥ 2, ti ≤ li − 2): trivial upper bound.
IIId) (li ≥ 2, ti > li): Then
s(si) = (|V
p| − ti − li − 1)α2+ti α1
> (|V p| − ti − li − 1 + 2(ti − 1))α2+α1
= (|V p|+ ti − li − 3)α2+α1
≥ smaxp (si),
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a contradiction, hence this case is not possible.
Second step. Using the previous case distinctions, we show that no subset candi-
date si can take more than one last position in V p2 . For this, without loss of generality,
we assume that the candidates si are sorted in decreasing order according to their cor-
responding li, i.e.,
s1, . . . , sj︸ ︷︷ ︸
li≥2
, sj+1, . . . , sr︸ ︷︷ ︸
li=1
, sr+1, . . . , st︸ ︷︷ ︸
li=0
.
Claim 1: In an extension in which c wins, it holds that li ≤ 1 for all i.
To prove Claim 1, we show that j = 0. More specifically, we prove that j > 0 implies
that the total benefit B :=
∑t
i=1 bi is less than 3k. This means that not all 3k element
candidates can take a last position and thus c cannot win.
Assume that j > 0. We start to show how to distribute the last and the first positions
of V p1 and V
p
2 in order to maximize B. For that sake, let Tj :=
∑j
i=1 ti denote the
number of top positions that were taken by the first j candidates s1, . . . , sj . Now, we
consider the remaining indices i ∈ {j + 1, . . . , t}. Since for all of them li ≤ 1, it must
also hold ti ≤ 1 (see Case I and Case II). Thus and because of Equation (4), there must
be at least t − k − Tj candidates from sj+1, . . . , st with ti = 1. For both remaining
cases (li = 1 and li = 0), the benefit bi is greater for the case ti = 0 than it is for
the case ti = 1 (cf. Case I and Case II). Hence, to maximize the total benefit B, it is
desirable to minimize the number of candidates having ti = 1. Since there are t − j
indices greater than j and ti must be equal to one for at least t− k − Tj indices, there
are at most t − j − (t − k − Tj) = k + Tj − j indices with ti = 0 (Observation 4).
Furthermore, for every index from {j + 1, . . . , sr}, by setting ti to zero or one, one
can “choose” between bi = 1 and bi = 3 (Case II). For the remaining indices, one can
choose between bi = 0 and bi = 1 by setting ti to zero or one (Case I). We show by
contradiction that choosing Case IIa (which results in bi = 3) as often as possible is
the way to maximize B:
Assume that Case IIa holds, that is li = 1 and ti = 0, is not chosen as often as
possible. Then, first, there must be an index i ∈ {j + 1, . . . , r} with ti = 1 and hence
with bi = 1 (Case IIb). Second, there must be an index x > r with tx = 0 and
hence bx = 1 (Case Ia). Then setting ti = 1 and tx = 0 does not violate Equation (4)
and has the following effect.
• bi is increased by 2 (from 1 to 3),
• bx is decreased by 1 (from 1 to 0).
Thus, B =
∑t
i=1 bi was not maximal.
Now, we have argued that to maximize B, one has to choose Case IIa as often
as possible (Observation 5). Using this, we can compute the maximal value maxB
of B (showing that is must be less than 3k). For that sake, we first consider the benefit
coming from the first j candidates s1, . . . , sj , which we denote by Bj :=
∑j
i=1 bi.
Let B0j denote the set of indices i ∈ {1, . . . , j} with bi = 0, let B1j denote the set of
indices i ∈ {1, . . . , j} with bi = 1, and let B3j denote the set of indices i ∈ {1, . . . , j}
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with bi = 3. Then, Case III directly gives the following bound for the number of top
positions assumed by the first j candidates.
Tj ≤
∑
i∈B0
j
li +
∑
i∈B1
j
(li − 1) +
∑
i∈B3
j
(li − 2) =
j∑
i=1
li − |B
1
j | − 2|B
3
j |, (5)
which will be needed in the following.
Due to the previous discussion we know that in the remaining positions, we have to
choose ti = 0 for k+Tj−j indices (cf. Observation 4) and one should choose Case IIa,
that is, li = 1 and ti = 0, as often as possible (cf. Observation 5). Clearly, li = 1
must be chosen k −
∑j
i=1 li times whereas there are k + Tj − j indices with ti = 0.
Hence, to compute a total upper bound on B, we have to distinguish two cases: First,
k −
∑j
i=1 li ≤ k + Tj − j, and, second, k −
∑j
i=1 li > k + Tj − j.
For the first case, we obtain
maxB = |B1j |+ 3|B
3
j |︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bj
+3 (k −
j∑
i=1
li)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
li=1, ti=0
+ k + Tj − j − (k −
j∑
i=1
li)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
li=0, ti=0
= |B1j |+ 3|B
3
j |+ 3k − 2 ·
j∑
i=1
li + Tj − j
(5)
≤ |B1j |+ 3|B
3
j |+ 3k − 2 ·
j∑
i=1
li +
j∑
i=1
li − |B
1
j | − 2|B
3
j | − j
= 3k −
j∑
i=1
li − j + |B
3
j |
Since |B3j | ≤ j it holds that the maximal value of B is strictly less than 3k for j ≥
1. Thus, at least one element candidate does not take a last position and hence beats c,
a contradiction.
For the second case, we obtain
maxB = |B1j |+ 3|B
3
j |︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bj
+3 (k + Tj − j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
li=1, ti=0
+ k −
j∑
i=1
li − (k + Tj − j)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
li=1, ti=1
= |B1j |+ 3|B
3
j |+ 3k + 2Tj − 2j −
j∑
i=1
li
(5)
≤ |B1j |+ 3|B
3
j |+ 3k +
j∑
i=1
li − |B
1
j | − 2|B
3
j |+ Tj − 2j −
j∑
i=1
li
= 3k + |B3j |+ Tj − 2j
Furthermore, in this case it follows directly from k−
∑j
i=1 li > k+Tj−j that
∑j
i=1 li+
Tj < j. For j > 0 this means that Tj < j. By definition, we have |B3j | ≤ j, and thus
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maxB is less than 3k. This completes the proof of Claim 1. We therefore have j = 0
which means li ≤ 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t} and thus also ti ≤ 1 for all i (Case I and II).
Third step. We now show that there cannot be any candidate si which takes one
last position and one first position in V1 ∪ V2, i.e. we cannot have ti = li = 1 for
any si. Assume that the set of candidates Q := {si | ti = li = 1} is not empty. Then,
due to Observation 3, the maximum value of B is
maxB = 1 · |Q|︸ ︷︷ ︸
li=ti=1
+3 · (k − |Q|)︸ ︷︷ ︸
li=1,ti=0
+ 0︸︷︷︸
li=0,ti=1
+ 1 · |Q|︸ ︷︷ ︸
li=ti=0
= 3k − |Q|,
a contradiction. Thus, t− k many of the subset candidates si take a top position in V p1 ,
and the remaining k subset candidates take a last position in V p2 . Now, each of these k
candidates must place its corresponding element candidates at the last positions in V p3 .
Since c can only be a winner if each of the 3k element candidates takes a last position
in a vote from V p3 and in total at most 3k element candidates can take a last position
in V p3 , every element candidate must take exactly one last position. Thus, for i 6= j
such that si and sj take a last position in V p2 , {ei1, ei2, ei3} and {ej1, ej2, ej3} must be
disjoint. It follows that {Si | si takes a last position in V p2 } forms an exact 3-cover. ✷
7. Putting all together
We are now ready to combine the many-one reductions from the previous sections
to one general reduction. Basically, the problem we encounter by using one specific re-
duction from the previous sections is that such a reduction produces a POSSIBLE WIN-
NER-instance with a certain number m of candidates. Thus, one needs to ensure that
the size-m scoring vector provides a sufficient number of positions with equal/different
scores. This seems not to be possible in general. However, for every specific instance of
EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS or MULTICOLORED CLIQUE, we can compute a number
of positions with equal or different scores that is sufficient for the corresponding reduc-
tion, and we can use the maximum of all these numbers for the combined reduction.
This is the underlying idea for the following proof.
Theorem 5. POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-complete for a scoring rule r if there is a con-
stant z such that all scoring vectors produced by r for more than z candidates are
different from (0, . . . , 0), (1, 0, . . . , 0), (1, . . . , 1, 0), and (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0).
PROOF. We give a reduction from X3C restricted to instances of size greater than z
to POSSIBLE WINNER for r. Let I with |I| > z denote an X3C-instance. Since
X3C and MC are NP-complete, there is a polynomial-time reduction from X3C to MC.
Hence, let I ′ denote an MC-instance whose size is polynomial in |I| and which is a
yes-instance if and only if I is a yes-instance.
Let f1 denote a poly-type function to compute the number of different score val-
ues as stated for Theorem 1, f ′1 as for Theorem 2, f ′2 as for Lemma 3, f2 as for
Lemma 4, f3 as for Lemma 5, f4 as for Lemma 6, and f5 as for Theorem 4. Define
x := max{f1(I), f ′1(I
′), f ′2(I
′), f2(I), f3(I), f4(I), f5(I)} and consider the scoring
vector −→α of size x · (x+ 1) produced by r. Then we show the following.
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Table 4: Subcases for scoring rules having an unbounded number of equal score values.
Case I ∃i ≤ m− 1 s.t. αi−x = · · · = αi−1 > αi Theorem 2
Case IIa ∃i ≥ 2, ∃j < i s.t. αi > αi+1 = · · · = αi+x and αj < 2αj+1 Lemma 3
Case IIb ∃i ≥ 2, ∃j < i s.t. αi > αi+1 = · · · = αi+x and αj ≥ 3αi Lemma 4
Case IIc (α1, α2, 0, . . . , 0) and 3α2 > α1 > 2α2 Lemma 5
Case IId (2, 1, 0, . . . , 0) Lemma 6
Case III α1 > α2 = αm−1 > αm = 0 and α1 6= 2 · α2 Theorem 4
Claim: For −→α it holds that |{i | αi > αi+1}| ≥ x or that αi = · · · = αi+x for some
position i.
The correctness of the claim can be seen as follows. First, assume that −→α does not
fulfill αi > αj for x different positions i. Then consider x ·(x+1) indices of−→α . Since
they can have at most x different score values, there must be a single score value that
is assigned to at least x + 1 indices, that is, there is an index i with αi = · · · = αi+x.
Second, if there is no index i such that αi = · · · = αi+x for a position i, then again
consider x · (x + 1) indices of −→α . Since each score value can be assumed at most x
times, there must be at least x different score values.
Now, due to the Claim, we can distinguish two main cases. If −→α has at least x dif-
ferent score values, then we apply the X3C-reduction given in Theorem 1. Otherwise,
we have an unbounded number of equal score values. In this case we distinguish the
subcases given in Table 4. For all these subcases, there are many-one reductions used
in the corresponding lemmata/theorems. Hence, it remains to show that each scoring
vector can be handled by at least one of these cases. Clearly, −→α must have the form
αi−x = · · · = αi−1 > αi for an i ≤ m − 1 (Case I), or αi > αi+1 = · · · = αi+x
for i ≥ 2 (Case II), or α1 > α2 = αm−1 > αm = 0 and α1 6= 2 · α2 (Case III). For
Case I and Case III, the existence of many-one reductions follows immediately from
the corresponding Theorems 2 and 4. Thus, it remains to discuss Case II, the case that
−→α has the form αi > αi+1 = · · · = αi+x for i ≥ 2.
To this end, we start with the case i > 2. Clearly, there must be at least three scoring
values which are not equal to zero, namely, αi−2, αi−1, and αi. If one has αi−1 < 2αi
or αi−2 < 2αi−1, then NP-hardness follows directly from Lemma 3. Otherwise, one
must have αi−1 ≥ 2αi and αi−2 ≥ 2αi−1. Hence, it follows that αi−2 ≥ 4αi and
NP-hardness follows directly from Lemma 4. It remains to consider all scoring rules
of type (α1, α2, 0, . . . , 0). Here, we can distinguish the following four cases:
• α1 < 2α2: NP-hardness follows from Lemma 3,
• α1 = 2α2: NP-hardness follows from Lemma 6,
• 2α2 < α1 < 3α2: NP-hardness follows from Lemma 5, and
• α1 ≥ 3α2: NP-hardness follows from Lemma 4.
Since the membership in NP is obvious, the main theorem follows. ✷
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Pure scoring rules. Based on all previous considerations, for pure scoring rules we
almost arrive at a dichotomy. More precisely, we can state the following.
Theorem 6. POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-complete for all non-trivial pure scoring rules
except plurality, veto, and scoring rules for which there is a constant z such that
the produced scoring vector is (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) for every number of candidates greater
than z. For plurality and veto it is solvable in polynomial time.
PROOF. Plurality and veto are polynomial-time solvable due to Proposition 1. Having
any non-trivial scoring vector different from (1, 0, . . . , 0), (1, . . . , 1, 0), and (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0)
for m candidates, it is not possible to obtain a scoring vector of one of these three types
(or (0, . . . , 0)) for m′ > m by inserting scoring values. Hence, since we only consider
pure scoring rules, the scoring rule does not produce a scoring vector of type plural-
ity, veto, (0, . . . , 0), or (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) for all m ≥ z. Then the statement follows by
Theorem 5. ✷
“Non-pure” scoring rules. We end this section with a brief informal discussion about
the problem of classifying non-pure scoring rules in general. As stated in Theorem 5,
we can show NP-hardness for non-pure scoring rules if (starting from a constant num-
ber of candidates) all produced scoring vectors are “difficult”. Clearly, it is possible to
extend the range of NP-hardness results to scoring rules that produce only few “easy”
vectors; for example, having a difficult vector for all odd numbers of candidates and
an easy vector for all even ones. However, this is not possible in general. Roughly
speaking, if the underlying difficult part of the language becomes too sparse, then there
cannot be a many-one reduction from an NP-complete problem since the densities of
the problems are not polynomially related (see e.g. [30]). Note that this situation does
not appear for the dichotomy result from Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [25] for
MANIPULATION for weighted voters. The intuitive reason for this is that their reduc-
tions for the NP-hardness in the case of weighted voters already hold for a constant
number of candidates (and all scoring rules except plurality are NP-hard in this case).
8. Conclusion and outlook
In this work, we settled the computational complexity for POSSIBLE WINNER for
almost all pure scoring rules. More precisely, the only case that was left open regards
the scoring rule defined by the scoring vector (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0), whereas for all other rules
except plurality and veto, we obtained NP-completeness results. In a very recent work,
Baumeister and Rothe [2] completed the dichotomy by showing the NP-completeness
of POSSIBLE WINNER for the case of (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0).
A natural next step of research is to investigate algorithmic approaches that deal
with NP-hard problems like approximation algorithms or “efficient” exponential-time
algorithms. Here, an interesting approach is to consider the parameterized complex-
ity [15, 23, 28] and its sequel multivariate algorithmics [29]. There are first consid-
erations for several voting rules [7] as well as fixed-parameter tractability results for
POSSIBLE WINNER for k-approval with respect to the combined parameter “number
of partial votes” and k [3]. A parameter of general interest is the “number of candi-
dates”. In this case, POSSIBLE WINNER is shown to be fixed-parameter tractable for
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several voting systems using a powerful classification framework based on integer lin-
ear programming but still lacks efficient combinatorial fixed-parameter algorithms [7].
Furthermore, multivariate complexity analysis might offer a way to tackle the POSSI-
BLE WINNER problem for voting systems for which the “normal” winner determina-
tion is already NP-hard. For example, there are recent studies for Kemeny, Dodgson,
and Young elections that contain parameterized algorithms with respect to several pa-
rameters [4, 5, 6, 32]. It is open whether such results can be achieved for the POSSIBLE
WINNER problem.
The POSSIBLE WINNER problem not only generalizes the MANIPULATION prob-
lem but also comprises other relevant special cases. For example, very recently, Cheva-
leyre et al. [10] investigated the computational complexity of the following problem:
Given a set of linear votes, an integer s, and a distinguished candidate c, can one add
s candidates such that c becomes a winner? There is reasonable hope to achieve more
positive algorithmic results for this and other relevant special cases of POSSIBLE WIN-
NER.
A further direction of future research regards the counting version of POSSIBLE
WINNER [1]. Here, one wants to find out in how many extensions a distinguished
candidate wins. Answering this question allows to compare two candidates that are
possible winners.
Acknowledgments. We thank Rolf Niedermeier and Johannes Uhlmann for fruitful dis-
cussion and helpful comments. We are very grateful to the anonymous referees of
MFCS’09 and JCSS for constructive and beneficial feedback that helped to signifi-
cantly improve this work.
References
[1] Y. Bachrach, N. Betzler, and P. Faliszewski. Probabilistic possible winner deter-
mination. In Proc. of 24th AAAI, 2010.
[2] D. Baumeister and J. Rothe. Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the
Possible Winner problem in pure scoring rules. Manuscript, 2010.
[3] N. Betzler. On problem kernels for possible winner determination under the k-
approval protocol. Manuscript, 2010.
[4] N. Betzler, M. R. Fellows, J. Guo, R. Niedermeier, and F. A. Rosamond. Fixed-
parameter algorithms for Kemeny rankings. Theor. Comput. Sci., 410:4554–4570,
2009.
[5] N. Betzler, J. Guo, C. Komusiewicz, and R. Niedermeier. Average parameteri-
zation and partial kernelization for computing medians. In Proc. of 9th LATIN,
LNCS. Springer, 2010.
[6] N. Betzler, J. Guo, and R. Niedermeier. Parameterized computational complexity
of Dodgson and Young elections. Inform. Comput., 208(2):165–177, 2010.
38
[7] N. Betzler, S. Hemmann, and R. Niedermeier. A multivariate complexity analysis
of determining possible winners given incomplete votes. In Proc. of 21st IJCAI,
2009.
[8] E. Brelsford, P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, I. Schnoor, and H. Schnoor. Ap-
proximability of manipulating elections. In Proc. of 23rd AAAI, pages 44–49.
AAAI Press, 2008.
[9] Y. Chevaleyre, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and N. Maudet. A short introduction to com-
putational social choice (invited paper). In Proc. of 33rd SOFSEM, volume 4362
of LNCS, pages 51–69. Springer, 2007.
[10] Y. Chevaleyre, J. Lang, N. Maudet, and J. Monnot. Possible winners when new
candidates are added: the case of scoring rules. AAAI, to appear, 2010.
[11] V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. Vote elicitation: Complexity and strategy-
proofness. In Proc. of 18th AAAI, pages 392–397. AAAI Press, 2002.
[12] V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. Communication complexity of common voting
rules. In Proc. of 6th EC, pages 78–87. ACM, 2005.
[13] V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, and J. Lang. When are elections with few candidates
hard to manipulate? J. ACM, 54(3):1–33, 2007.
[14] T. H. Cormen, C. E. Leiserson, R. L. Rivest, and C. Stein. Introduction to Algo-
rithms. MIT Press, 2nd edition, 2001.
[15] R. G. Downey and M. R. Fellows. Parameterized Complexity. Springer, 1999.
[16] E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, and A. Slinko. Swap bribery. In Proc. of 2nd SAGT,
volume 5814 of LNCS, pages 299–310. Springer, 2009.
[17] P. Faliszewski. Nonuniform bribery (short paper). In Proc. 7th AAMAS, pages
1569–1572, 2008.
[18] P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L. A. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. Llull and
Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control. J. Artif.
Intell. Res., 35:275–341, 2009.
[19] P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L. A. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. A richer
understanding of the complexity of election systems. In Fundamental Problems
in Computing: Essays in Honor of Professor Daniel J. Rosenkrantz, chapter 14,
pages 375–406. Springer, 2009.
[20] P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L. A. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. The shield
that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manip-
ulation and control. In Proc. of TARK XII, pages 118–127. ACM, 2009.
[21] P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, and H. Schnoor. Copeland voting: Ties matter.
In Proc. of 7th AAMAS, pages 983–990, 2008.
39
[22] M. R. Fellows, D. Hermelin, F. A. Rosamond, and S. Vialette. On the param-
eterized complexity of multiple-interval graph problems. Theor. Comput. Sci.,
410(1):53–61, 2009.
[23] J. Flum and M. Grohe. Parameterized Complexity Theory. Springer, 2006.
[24] M. R. Garey and D. S. Johnson. Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the
Theory of NP-Completeness. W. H. Freeman, 1979.
[25] E. Hemaspaandra and L. A. Hemaspaandra. Dichotomy for voting systems. J.
Comput. Syst. Sci., 73(1):73–83, 2007.
[26] K. Konczak and J. Lang. Voting procedures with incomplete preferences. In Proc.
of IJCAI-2005 Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling,
2005.
[27] J. Lang, M. S. Pini, F. Rossi, K. B. Venable, and T. Walsh. Winner determination
in sequential majority voting. In Proc. of 20th IJCAI, pages 1372–1377, 2007.
[28] R. Niedermeier. Invitation to Fixed-Parameter Algorithms. Oxford University
Press, 2006.
[29] R. Niedermeier. Reflections on multivariate algorithmics and problem parameter-
ization. In Proc. of 27th STACS, pages 17–32, 2010.
[30] C. H. Papadimitriou. Computational Complexity. Addison-Wesley, 1994.
[31] M. S. Pini, F. Rossi, K. B. Venable, and T. Walsh. Incompleteness and incom-
parability in preference aggregation. In Proc. of 20th IJCAI, pages 1464–1469,
2007.
[32] N. Simjour. Improved parameterized algorithms for the Kemeny aggregation
problem. In Proc. of 4th IWPEC, volume 5917 of LNCS, pages 312–323, 2009.
[33] T. Walsh. Uncertainty in preference elicitation and aggregation. In Proc. of 22nd
AAAI, pages 3–8. AAAI Press, 2007.
[34] L. Xia and V. Conitzer. Determining possible and necessary winners under com-
mon voting rules given partial orders. In Proc. of 23rd AAAI, pages 196–201.
AAAI Press, 2008.
[35] L. Xia, V. Conitzer, and A. D. Procaccia. A scheduling approach to coalitional
manipulation. In Proc. of 11th EC. ACM, 2010. To appear.
[36] L. Xia, M. Zuckerman, A. D. Procaccia, V. Conitzer, and J. S. Rosenschein. Com-
plexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules.
In Proc. 21st IJCAI, pages 348–353, 2009.
[37] M. Zuckerman, A. D. Procaccia, and J. S. Rosenschein. Algorithms for the coali-
tional manipulation problem. Artif. Intell., 173(2):392–412, 2009.
40
